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Judicial Leadership on the UK Supreme Court 
Rosemary Hunter and Erika Rackley* 
Abstract 
This article examines judicial leadership on the UK Supreme Court. It does not confine itself to the 
formal roles of the President and Deputy President. Rather building on existing categories of judicial 
leadership, including administrative, jurisprudential and community leadership, it considers the 
contributions of all 12 Justices. In so doing, it provides a significant compilation of quantitative data 
on the activities of the Justices of the Supreme Court both on and off the bench. From this, we 
suggest that while a number of current UK Supreme Court Justices are engaging in one or two broad 
forms of leadership – with Lady Hale in particular demonstrating a substantial degree of leadership 
across all three dimensions – at the other end of the spectrum, at least on the measures used in this 
article, a significant minority are not. In light of this, and the significant number of recent and 
forthcoming retirements from the Court, the article concludes by considering the implications of our 
findings for the future of the Court. We argue that these retirements will result in gaps in both 
formal and informal judicial leadership, and it is vital that these gaps are filled by appointees who 
are capable of, and prepared to step up to, diverse and varied forms of judicial leadership. 
 
Introduction 
This article examines judicial leadership on the UK Supreme Court. In doing so, it does not confine 
itself to the formal roles of the President and Deputy President.1 While the President and Deputy 
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Birmingham. We would like to thank Tina Martin for research assistance and Alan Paterson, Kate Malleson, Graham Gee, 
Brenda Hale and the journal’s anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments on earlier versions of this 
article. 
1
  Much of the literature on judicial leadership focuses on formal leaderships roles, typically that of Chief Justice, 
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President are formal leaders of the court, all 12 members of the Supreme Court may be considered, 
in a broader sense, to be judicial leaders. In constituting the final court of appeal in the UK, they 
occupy a prominent public position at the apex of the judicial system and as such, represent the 
judiciary in the eyes of the public, the media and the legal profession. This is recognised, for 
example, in the criteria for appointment to the Supreme Court, which include exceptional 
intellectual ability and interest in the law, ‘appreciation of the developing nature of the constitution 
and law in England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales’, and ‘[an] ability to participate in the 
representational role of a Supreme Court Justice’.2 This article therefore asks how the Justices of the 
UK Supreme Court act as leaders.  
In answering this question, the article makes two distinct contributions to the socio-legal 
literature on courts and judging. First, it seeks to expand the conceptions of judicial leadership, 
building on existing categories of administrative, jurisprudential and community leadership but 
applying them to encompass a broader range of judicial activities than have previously been 
considered. Secondly, it provides a significant compilation of quantitative data on the activities of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
see eg, D Danelski ‘The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court’ in S Goldman and A 
Sarat (eds) American Court Systems: Readings in Judicial Process and Behaviour (New York: WH Freeman & Co Ltd, 1978); L 
Greenhouse ‘How Not to be Chief Justice: The Apprenticeship of William H. Rehnquist’ (2006) 154 Penn L Rev 1365; VA 
Hettinger et al ‘The Role and Impact of Chief Judges on the United States Court of Appeals’ (2003) 24 Just Sys J 91; G Gallas 
‘Judicial Leadership Excellence: A Research Prospectus’ (1987) 12 Just Sys J 39; SL Haynie ‘Leadership and Consensus on the 
US Supreme Court’ (1992) 54(4) The Journal of Politics 1158; P McCormick ‘Assessing Leadership on the Supreme Court of 
Canada: Towards a Typology of Chief Justice Performance’ (1993) 4 Sup Ct L Rev 409; P McCormick ‘Follow the Leader: 
Judicial Power and Judicial Leadership on the Laskin Court, 1973-1984’ (1998) 24 Queen’s L J 237; CL Osterberg, ME 
Wetstein and CR Ducat ‘Leaders, Followers and Outsiders: Task and Social Leadership on the Canadian Supreme Court in 
the Early Nineties’ (2004) 36(3) Polity 505; K Leakey ‘The Role of the Chief Justice in Commonwealth Africa’, PhD thesis, 
Queen Mary University of London (2012). 
2
  UK Supreme Court, ‘Information Pack: Vacancies for Appointment as President of the Supreme Court [and] 
Justice of The Supreme Court’ (February 2017): https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/judicial-vacancies-2017-information-
pack.pdf.  
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the Justices of the Supreme Court both on and off the bench. Whereas long-running statistical 
studies of apex court exist in other jurisdictions, this has not yet occurred in the UK. Our data may 
thus provide the impetus and a baseline for future research and analysis of this nature.3  
The article begins with a brief account of the dimensions of judicial leadership identified in 
the literature. We explain our reasons for focusing on the three dimensions of administrative, 
jurisprudential and community leadership and the methodology we adopted for measuring them in 
terms of decided cases and extra-judicial activities. We subsequently set out our findings on these 
measures, identifying which Supreme Court Justices emerge as leaders on the court within each 
category. On the basis of this analysis, it appears that while a number of current UK Supreme Court 
Justices are engaging in one or two broad forms of leadership, Lady Hale is exceptional in 
demonstrating a substantial degree of leadership across all three dimensions, while at the other end 
of the spectrum – at least on the measures used in this article – a significant minority do not stand 
out on any dimension. In light of this, and the significant number of recent and forthcoming 
retirements from the Court, the article concludes by considering the implications of our findings for 
the future of the Court. We argue that these retirements will result in gaps in both formal and 
informal judicial leadership, and it is vital that these gaps are filled by appointees who are capable 
of, and prepared to step up to, diverse and varied forms of judicial leadership.  
 
Dimensions of Judicial Leadership 
The existing literature identifies four broad categories of judicial leadership.4 The language used to 
describe these categories varies, but for the purposes of our analysis we have termed them 
                                                          
3
  See, eg, the long-running statistical analyses of the US Supreme Court published annually in the Harvard Law 
Review (most recently, ‘The Statistics’ (2016) 130 (1) HLR 507) and of the Australian High Court by Lynch and Williams 
beginning in 2003 (most recently, A Lynch and G Williams ‘The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 2015 Statistics’ (2016) 
38(3) UNSWLJ 1161). 
4
  See generally, A Paterson The Law Lords (London: Macmillan, 1982); A Paterson Final Judgment: The Last Law 
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‘administrative leadership’, ‘jurisprudential leadership’, ‘social leadership’ and ‘community 
leadership’. There are clearly potential overlaps between these categories – particularly between 
administrative leadership and the other categories – which we identify in the course of the 
discussion and analysis. However, the categories are useful heuristically in considering the variety of 
ways in which judges may exercise leadership generally, as well as in considering variety within 
particular forms of leadership. 
 
Administrative leadership 
Administrative leadership encompasses judicial governance – the running of the judiciary as a whole 
and/or of a specific court – and managing and negotiating relationships with other branches of 
government (especially the Ministry of Justice) as well as with bodies like Her Majesty’s Courts and 
Tribunals Service (HMCTS) and the Judicial Appointments Commission.5 Together, these aspects of 
administrative leadership involve taking responsibility for the ‘overall health of the judicial 
institution and for its effectiveness in dispensing substantial justice in the society that relies on [it]’.6 
This form of judicial leadership is thus about ‘building stronger institutions and more effective 
systems of justice’7 rather than making case law through decisions in individual matters. This 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Lords and the Supreme Court  (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) and R Cornes ‘Gains (and Dangers of Losses) in Translation – 
The Leadership Function in the United Kingdom's Supreme Court, Parameters and Prospects’ [2011] PL 509 (on the UK); 
and RT Shepard ‘The Changing Nature of Judicial Leadership’ (2009) 42 Ind L Rev 767 and WF Murphy ‘Courts as Small 
Groups’ (1966) 79 HLR 1565 (on the US). 
5
  There is a considerable amount of general leadership literature relevant to this role (but not relevant to this 
article). See eg RM Stogdill and BM Bass Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research (New York: The Free 
Press, 1990); K Grint Leadership: Limits and Possibilities (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); JM Burns Leadership 
(London: Harper Collins, 2010); DV Day and J Antonakis (eds) The Nature of Leadership (London: Sage, 2
nd
 edn, 2011); PG 
Northouse Leadership: Theory and Practice (London: Sage, 7
th
 edn, 2015). 
6
  Shepard, above n 4, p 767.  
7
  Ibid. 
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dimension usually corresponds with formal leadership roles such as President and Deputy President 
of the Supreme Court, the Lord Chief Justice, Master of the Rolls, Heads of Division and Senior 
Presiding Judge. The President and Deputy President of the UK Supreme Court, for example, have 
specific administrative roles conferred by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, including determining 
the composition of panels for permission to appeal and full hearings;8 requesting senior appellate 
judges and retired appellate judges to act on the Supreme Court;9 making the Court’s rules;10 dealing 
with complaints and discipline; and sitting on appointment panels for new Supreme Court Justices.11  
At the same time, however, it is clear that some elements of administrative leadership are 
undertaken by judges other than those with formal leadership roles. Indeed, it has been argued that 
it is the responsibility of every ‘modern judge’ to act as a ‘guardian of our legal system’ and ensure 
that it is fit for purpose.12 In the context of the Supreme Court, while all Justices have general 
responsibility for institution building and the protection of the administration of justice, others take 
on specific roles. Lord Kerr, for example, has chaired the joint UKSC and JCPC User group, and Lord 
                                                          
8
  Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (CRA), s 42. 
9
 CRA, ss 38-39. 
10
 CRA, s 45. 
11
  Originally both the President and Deputy President sat on the ad hoc appointment commissions for 
appointments to the Supreme Court. However, in response to concerns about the dominance of the Supreme Court 
leadership in appointments to the Court, the Constitutional Reform Act was amended in 2013 to specify simply that the 
commission must include ‘at least one judge of the Court’ (s 27, as amended by the Crime and Courts Act 2013, s 20 and 
Sch 13). It has not gone unnoticed that the removal of the Deputy President from a formal role in Supreme Court 
appointments coincided with the appointment of Lady Hale as Deputy President. In practice, the President continues to sit 
on selection commissions other than when his successor is being appointed, and retains significant influence in the 
appointments process through his position as chair of the panel, or in the selection of his nominee when he is not a 
member.    
12
  Vos J cited with approval by Lord Carnwath in ‘”Do Judges use Gavels?” The Modern Judge in Myth and Reality’, 
Lecture at the Judicial College, 16 January 2013. 
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Hodge is a member, alongside the President and Deputy President, of the Court’s Strategic Advisory 
Board.13 
 
Jurisprudential leadership 
Jurisprudential or ‘thought’ leadership refers to the influence of a given judge on the decisions or 
jurisprudence of the Court, in a specific area or more generally. In our view, jurisprudential 
leadership may encompass influence over time as well as persuasion in individual cases; that is, it 
may involve the development of a line of thought at odds with the Court’s general position but 
which is nonetheless jurisprudentially important. Much of the existing literature, however, employs 
a narrower conception of jurisprudential leaders as the judges who ‘bring others with them’, who 
have dominant voices on the bench, and who are able to persuade others to their point of view.14 In 
this vein, Richard Cornes notes: 
on any collegial court there is always the potential for de facto leaders to emerge … In 
relation to jurisprudential leadership a top court may contain judges who, while not holding 
one of the court's formal leadership roles (with its managerial prerogatives), nevertheless 
emerge either in discrete areas of case law, or vis à vis a ‘block of the court’, or perhaps even 
more expansively in the majority of cases, as the court's intellectual leader.15 
Alan Paterson, adopting David Danelski, terms this ‘task leadership’, that is, the exercise of 
‘effective leadership concerning decisional outcomes’, which may be a product of ‘personality, 
esteem within the court, intelligence, technical competence and persuasive ability’.16 His two 
qualitative studies of the House of Lords and the Supreme Court – The Law Lords (1982) and Final 
                                                          
13
  The Supreme Court Annual Report and Accounts 2015-2016 (2016) pp 42, 16. 
14
  See eg Lady Hale’s discussion of Lord Bingham’s leadership style in B Hale ‘A Supreme Judicial Leader’ in M 
Andernas and D Fairgrieve (eds) Tom Bingham and the Transformation of the Law: A Liber Amicorum (Oxford: OUP, 2009) p 
209.  
15
  Cornes, above n 4, p 512. 
16
  Paterson (1982), above n 4, p 116; Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 146. 
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Judgment (2013) – provide insights into how task leadership is achieved, through group orientation, 
tactics or lobbying, and the stages at which it may occur, during the hearing of the case, at the first 
conference after the hearing, or in the circulation of judgments. Notable jurisprudential or ‘task’ 
leaders in the UK, Cornes and Paterson suggest, have included Lords Reid, Diplock, Atkin, 
Wilberforce, and, more recently, Lords Bingham and Dyson.17   
There is clearly potential for overlap between formal administrative leadership and 
jurisprudential leadership, as possession of the formal role may provide a tactical advantage, or 
respect for the formal role may translate into informal powers of persuasion in decision-making. This 
has certainly been observed in relation to the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.18 
Paterson suggests that this has been less the case in the House of Lords and UK Supreme Court, in 
part because the Presiding Law Lord or Justice traditionally speaks last at post-hearing conferences, 
whereas the US Chief Justice traditionally speaks first, and thus has greater opportunity for 
jurisprudential leadership.19 Speaking last does not necessarily reduce the scope for influence, 
however. For example, Lady Hale has said of Lord Bingham as Senior Law Lord in post-hearing 
conferences:  
What he [Lord Bingham] does say will be hugely influential and may well persuade others to 
change their minds. It is not unknown to hear four views going one way, and then to hear 
Lord Bingham going the other way, after which the four eventually decide to come around 
to Lord Bingham's point of view.20 
Nevertheless, both Hale and Paterson contend that Lord Bingham persuaded his colleagues not by 
virtue of his role as Senior Law Lord but by ‘the sheer force of his intellect and the clarity of his 
                                                          
17
  Cornes, ibid, p 509; Paterson (1982), ibid, pp 116-119; Paterson (2013), ibid, p 146. 
18
  See eg Hettinger, above n 1, pp 91-117. 
19
  Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 147. 
20
  Hale, above n 14, p 219. 
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thinking’.21 Paterson also maintains that Lords Phillips and Hope enjoyed mixed success as 
jurisprudential leaders.22 
 
Social leadership 
Social leadership, a category identified by Danelski,23 is focused on the collegial and emotional needs 
of the court. Social leaders endeavour to keep the court socially cohesive despite the inevitable 
conflicts which arise when important issues are at stake.24 They are likely to have ‘warm, receptive 
and responsive’ personalities and to be among the best liked members of the court.25 For example, 
Paterson describes Lord Brown as the social leader of the House of Lords during the Bingham era. 
His office was strategically located near the secretaries’ office and the coffee machine in the Law 
Lords’ corridor. As a result, everyone came past his office, and he encouraged his colleagues to drop 
in so that his office became the Court’s social centre. Interestingly, after the move to the new 
Supreme Court building, although Lord Brown’s personality (we assume) did not change, his 
strategic geographical position did. His office was more isolated and did not provide the same 
opportunities for frequent interaction with colleagues, resulting in a considerably reduced role as 
social mediator.26   
 
Community leadership 
Finally, we use the term ‘community leadership’ to refer to the various ways in which judges engage 
in outreach work to the court’s various communities, including the general public, the legal 
                                                          
21
  Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 148. 
22
  Ibid, pp 162-164. 
23
  Danelski, above n 1; D Danelski ‘Conflict and its Resolution on the Supreme Court’ (1967) 11 Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 71.   
24
  Paterson (1982), above n 4, p 105; Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 146.  
25
  Ibid. 
26
  Paterson (2013), above n 4, pp 157, 166-168. 
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profession, academia (including law students), the devolved jurisdictions and international 
judiciaries. This kind of extra-judicial work – described by Cornes as ‘judicial statespersonship’27 – 
helps to instil public and professional confidence in the court, reinforces its accessibility and 
openness, and expresses a commitment to judicial institution-building at the broadest level.28 It also 
provides what in academia would be called ‘esteem indicators’ – that is, indications of the individual 
judge’s profile beyond the court and the extent to which they are in demand as a speaker. Since its 
inception the Supreme Court’s Annual Reports have detailed many of the Justices’ extra-curricular 
activities including overseas visits, educational visits, special events and media engagement. 
Community leadership also includes what Peter McCormick terms ‘academic leadership’, 
that is, an influence extending beyond court decisions to academic thinking about doctrinal 
development.29 This form of judicial leadership is not unproblematic. While, of course, the views 
expressed by superior court judges in an academic article do not constitute precedent, ignoring 
them may, for example, result in significant additional costs for the litigants consequent upon a 
successful appeal. This may in turn lead to undue weight being attached to the views expressed by a 
superior court judge in such writings by counsel and even lower court judges who feel compelled to 
shape their arguments or judgments accordingly.30  
To the extent that judicial speeches and academic publications on doctrinal subjects 
contribute to the development of the law, they may also constitute a form of jurisprudential 
leadership. On the whole, however, extra-judicial speeches and publications address a range of 
topics and are delivered to and published in a great variety of audiences and venues – specialist or 
                                                          
27
  Cornes, above n 4, pp 537 ff. 
28
  Also seen in publication of its Annual Report, the introduction of press summaries of decisions, and accessibility 
of its website. See further R Cornes ‘A Constitutional Disaster in the Making? The Communications Challenge Facing the 
United Kingdom’s Supreme Court’ [2013] PL 266; Cornes, above n 4; and, in a US context, KM Esterling ‘Public Outreach: 
The Cornerstone of Judicial Independence’ (1998-1999) 82 Judicature 112. 
29
  P McCormick ‘Judges, Journals and Exegesis: Judicial Leadership and Academic Scholarship’ (1996) 45 UNBLJ 139. 
30
   Ibid, pp 141-143. 
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generalist, academic or practitioner, scholarly journals, text books or practice manuals. In this article, 
we have chosen to treat all extra-judicial speeches and publications under the heading of community 
leadership rather than attempting to distinguish between those which may count as 
jurisprudentially- versus community-oriented. 
 
Observing judicial leadership 
The different forms of judicial leadership identified above may not all be performed by the same 
judges. As Paterson has clearly identified, those with formal administrative leadership roles are not 
necessarily also jurisprudential leaders or social leaders of the Court. Likewise, jurisprudential 
leaders on the Court may not all be able or willing to travel regularly to outside speaking 
engagements. Moreover, some forms of leadership are more readily observable than others. While 
jurisprudential leadership may be discerned from an analysis of decided cases, many of the tasks of 
administrative leadership are performed behind closed doors, with only those directly relating to 
administrative leadership of the Court’s adjudicative functions likely to be observable. Similarly, 
social leadership is likely to be known only to ‘insiders’, or to someone who has closely observed 
and/or interviewed members of the Court.31 Finally, though various indicia of community leadership 
– such as speeches to various audiences published on the Court’s website, or instances of liaison 
with overseas judiciaries published in the Supreme Court’s Annual Report – may be observed, these 
are limited to those of which there is a public record.  
In the following section we describe the methodology we adopted in our study of leadership 
on the UK Supreme Court. This methodology was empirical and quantitative, using only publicly 
available data accessed primarily via the Court’s website. Our reasons for adopting this methodology 
                                                          
31
  Eg Paterson (1982), above n 4; Paterson (2013), above n 4; P Darbyshire Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of 
Judges (Oxford: Hart, 2011); G Gee, R Hazell, K Malleson and P O'Brien The Politics of Judicial Independence in the UK’s 
Changing Constitution (Cambridge: CUP, 2015). These methods too carry their own limitations, including the dangers of 
researcher capture and the reproduction of received wisdom, to which statistical analysis is relatively immune. 
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were twofold. First, it is important to understand how the Supreme Court Justices appear to outside 
observers. Consequently, we have based our analysis on the freely available information about the 
Justices’ activities to which the media, the public, law students and most members of the legal 
profession have access. Secondly, our methodology is replicable. Other scholars are able – and 
indeed invited – to reproduce, update and engage with our results. They are not reliant on exclusive 
access to inside or restricted information on the workings of the Court.  
The limitation of this approach is that our account cannot claim to be comprehensive. We 
have not, for example, been able to observe ‘behind the scenes’ forms of leadership such as social 
leadership and inter-institutional aspects of administrative leadership. Rather, the article focuses on 
the dimensions of leadership which are quantifiable and empirically observable to members of the 
Court’s various publics, that is, administrative leadership of the Court’s adjudicative functions, 
jurisprudential leadership and community leadership. The benefit of this approach is that it is more 
open to debate and less reliant on self-reporting than ‘trusted insider’ accounts such as Paterson’s.32 
Statistics do not, however, speak for themselves, but must be interpreted, and we have drawn on 
the existing qualitative research in interpreting our data. Thus, we would argue that both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches yield important insights and are complementary. At the 
same time, we acknowledge that alternative interpretations of our data may be available and we 
hope our analysis will provoke discussion and debate in this regard. 
 
Methodology 
Our primary method was to undertake a systematic analysis of all decisions issued by the Supreme 
Court in the six-year period between its inception in October 2009 and the end of the 2014-15 
judicial year. This amounted to a total of 402 decisions. The last decision included in the dataset was 
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  Though we, of course, recognize and acknowledge that Paterson also includes statistical analysis in both his 
accounts.  
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R (on the application of Tigere) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills.33 Each 
decision was coded for a range of variables including the date, number and identity of the Justices 
sitting on the case, the overall outcome, the jurisdiction and area(s) of law involved, which Justice 
presided, and the result reached and type of judgment written by each of the Justices. This data for 
each decision was entered into an SPSS database and analysed using frequencies and cross-
tabulations. Where the numbers were sufficiently large to allow for meaningful analysis, associations 
between categorical variables were explored using chi-squared tests.  
 Since the literature on quantitative analysis of court decisions is not consistent, some 
explanation of the categories used in our coding scheme is required. First, we adopted the ‘case’ as 
our unit of analysis – that is, each item with a separate medium-neutral citation number ([20XX] 
UKSC n) was counted as a single unit, regardless of the number of appeals that may have been 
conjoined within it. Some other long-running studies have counted individual appeals rather than 
cases,34 which would inflate the number of matters decided, but we have followed Paterson in 
counting cases rather than the number of appeals within them. As Paterson explains: 
When it comes to calculating the rates at which judges dissent, or write judgments or 
concurrences the fairer approach appears to be to focus on ‘cases’ rather than ‘appeals’ 
because of the distorting effect that multiple appeals can have. Thus, if a Law Lord dissents 
on his own in a ‘case’ with five conjoined ‘appeals’, this will be counted as a single dissent, 
not five dissents.35 
                                                          
33
  R (on the application of Tigere) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2015] UKSC 57. 
34
  See eg A Lynch ‘Dissent: Towards a Methodology for Measuring Judicial Disagreement in the High Court of 
Australia’ (2002) 24(4) Syd L Rev 470, p 502 and n 88, explaining the methodology used by the Harvard Law Review in its 
annual review of US Supreme Court decisions, which Lynch and Williams partially follow in their annual review of High 
Court of Australia decisions (see n 3). Lynch and Williams, however, count individual appeals only in cases involving 
multiple appeals in which all of the appeals are not decided uniformly. 
35
 Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 14.  
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Secondly, we categorised the overall outcome of each case as either ‘unanimous’, ‘single 
dissent’, or ‘split’. This meant either that all Justices agreed in the overall result (regardless of their 
reasons for doing so), or all but one of the Justices agreed with the result, or two or more of the 
Justices disagreed with the result. Again, this is consistent with Paterson36 but not with some other 
studies, which use the category ‘unanimous’ only when all members of the Court adopt the same 
reasons as well as the same result.37 Consistent with our definition of unanimity, we categorised 
Justices as being in the majority or minority when they agreed or disagreed with the overall result of 
the case (regardless of reasons for doing so).38 We also included a category of ‘half-half’, which 
applied in cases involving multiple appeals or multiple issues, when a Justice agreed with the 
majority result on some of the appeals or issues but disagreed on others. 
Thirdly, we used multiple categories to describe the type of judgment delivered by each 
Justice in each case: read the Judgment of the Court,39 joined in the Judgment of the Court, single 
lead, joint lead, single concurrence, joint concurrence, single agreement, joint agreement, single 
dissent, joint dissent, single part concurrence-part dissent, or joint part concurrence-part dissent. A 
‘Judgment of the Court’ is the name given to single unanimous judgments of the Supreme Court 
                                                          
36
 Ibid. 
37
  See eg Lynch, above n 34, p 479; A Lynch ‘The Gleeson Court on Constitutional Law: An Empirical Analysis of its 
First Five Years’ (2003) 26(1) UNSWLJ 32, p 39; MC Belleau and R. Johnson ‘Judging Gender: Difference and Dissent at the 
Supreme Court of Canada’ (2008) 15(1/2) IJLP 57, p 58; T Poole and S Shah ‘The Law Lords and Human Rights’ (2011) 74(1) 
MLR 79, pp 85-86. Poole and Shah distinguish between cases which are ‘unanimous’ (involving a single set of reasons, 
either in a joint judgment or a leading judgment plus individual agreements) and those which are ‘unanimous by 
concurrence’ (involving a leading judgment plus one or more concurrences with the same result). 
38
  Cf MC Belleau, R Johnson and C Vinters ‘Voicing an Opinion: Authorship, Collaboration and the Judgments of 
Justice Bertha Wilson’ (2008) 41 Sup Ct L Rev 53, p 56 in which ‘majority’ means reasons supported by a majority of judges, 
while ‘plurality’ means the situation where no set of reasons commanded a majority. 
39
  In accordance with tradition, all Supreme Court judgments are delivered orally – often to a largely empty court – 
rather than simply being issued in written form. Thus the Justice who reads the Judgment of the Court is the one who 
delivers it orally. 
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when no individual author or authors are identified. The judgment and/or the press summary issued 
by the Supreme Court usually makes clear, however, which Justice read the Judgment of the Court, 
and for analytical purposes we have taken this to be equivalent to authorship of a leading judgment. 
In all other types of judgment, ‘single’ denotes sole authorship, while ‘joint’ denotes multiple 
authorship (regardless of the number who joined in the judgment). A ‘leading judgment’, for our 
purposes, is a judgment which is clearly recognised as the lead by the other members of a 
unanimous Court, or by the majority where the Court is not unanimous. Such recognition may be in 
the form of simple agreements with that judgment, or concurrences which refer to that judgment 
and seek only to elaborate or offer differing reasons to a limited degree. Generally, the leading 
judgment is printed first and does the essential groundwork of explaining the facts, issues and 
arguments in the case; however this is not invariably true as the groundwork may appear in a 
judgment whose reasoning and/or conclusions were not ultimately accepted by the majority, or may 
appear in more than one judgment. We adopted the coding rule that there could only be one 
leading judgment per case, and in some cases there was no leading judgment but only a series of 
concurrences with the overall or majority result.  
We defined a ‘concurrence’ as a judgment which was not the leading judgment but which 
said something substantive about one or more of the issues involved, while arriving at the same 
result as the rest of the court or as the majority – in other words, the same result but for reasons 
that differed in some respect.40 By contrast with a concurrence, an ‘agreement’ was a simple 
statement that the Justice agreed with one or more of the other Justices without adding any 
reasoning of their own. The Justice(s) with whom they agreed could be either in the majority or the 
minority. A ‘dissent’ was a judgment which gave substantive reasons and disagreed with the result 
reached by the majority. A ‘part concurrence-part dissent’ was the kind of judgment written when 
                                                          
40
  We started out attempting to distinguish between brief and more substantial concurrences but abandoned the 
effort because the distinction proved unworkable in practice. 
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the Justice took a ‘half-half’ position on the result – that is, they gave reasons partly concurring with 
the majority result and partly dissenting from it.41      
These definitions, while appearing straightforward, again differ from those used in some 
other studies. Some studies have not employed a separate category of agreement but have counted 
all agreements as concurrences.42  While this might simplify analysis, we consider there to be an 
important difference to be captured in distinguishing between concurrences and agreements, in 
terms of willingness or felt need to articulate a different point of view and to write substantively.43 
More importantly, some have taken a different approach to the dividing line between concurrence 
and dissent. Andrew Lynch and George Williams in their examination of the decisions of the High 
Court of Australia, for example, count as concurrences only those judgments which agree with the 
ultimate orders issued by the court, and dissents those judgments which disagree with the final 
orders.44 Thus, for example, a judge who agreed with the overall result (in favour of the appellant or 
respondent) but who would have disposed of the case differently (for example, by remitting the case 
for re-hearing by the lower court rather than by substituting the appeal court’s own decision) would 
count as dissenting. Paterson includes in his category of dissents ‘judgments which agree on the 
outcome favoured by the majority but whose reasoning is radically different from that of the 
majority’,45 whereas we have counted these kinds of judgments as concurrences. Marie-Claire 
Belleau and Rebecca Johnson, whose focus is on dissenting judgments in the Supreme Court of 
                                                          
41
  By contrast, Poole and Shah, following the Harvard Law Review, would count these judgments as dissents (above 
n 37, pp 84, 86). 
42
 Eg Lynch, above n 34, p 481; Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 11. Cf Poole and Shah, above n 37, p 85 who, like us, 
distinguish between concurrences (involving substantive reasoning) and simple agreements, which they term ‘I concur 
opinions’.  
43
  See also Poole and Shah, ibid.  
44
 Lynch, above n 34, pp 471-483, following the Harvard Law Review. 
45
 Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 12. 
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Canada, also refer to ‘disagreement through the form of a concurrence’46 and take concurrences to 
be ‘a form of judicial dissent’.47   
We rejected these other approaches for reasons of clarity, consistency and simplicity. Lynch 
and Williams’ approach may lead to the counter-intuitive result that the numerical majority of 
judgments could be counted as dissents. Paterson’s approach inevitably introduces an element of 
subjective judgement in the determination that reasoning is ‘radically different’ from that of the 
majority, whereas the overall result constitutes a more objective dividing line and enabled us to 
avoid making judgements about the nature of the reasoning employed. Further, we considered 
language such as ‘concurrence as a form of dissent’ to be unhelpful and potentially confusing, 
although we discuss further below the various reasons why judges may choose to write 
concurrences.   
In classifying the subject matter of cases we took an inclusive approach. Rather than trying 
to assign each case to a single or dominant area of law, we instead decided to reflect the reality that 
individual cases might fall within several areas of law,48 for example ‘criminal procedure’ and ‘human 
rights’,49 or ‘employment law’ and ‘EU law’,50 or ‘civil procedure’, ‘insolvency law’ and 
‘property/land/equity’.51 This meant that the total number of subjects was greater than the total 
                                                          
46
 Belleau and Johnson, above n 37, p 60. 
47
 Belleau et al, above n 38, p 64. 
48
  Our classification scheme comprised the following subjects: administrative law, civil procedure, company law, 
consumer law, contract/commercial law, constitutional law, criminal law, criminal procedure, discrimination law, 
employment law, environmental law, EU law, evidence, family law, housing law, human rights law, immigration/asylum 
law, insolvency law, intellectual property law, medical law, planning law, property/land/equity, tax law, tort law, welfare 
law, and ‘other’. Subjects which appeared several times in the ‘other’ category included the Proceeds of Crime Act, 
insurance, counter-terrorism, sentencing and costs. 
49
  Eg R v Horncastle and others [2009] UKSC 14. 
50
  Eg British Airways plc v Williams and others [2010] UKSC 16. 
51
  Eg Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd and another [2014] UKSC 41. 
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number of cases. In addition, we grouped subjects together into the broad categories of 
Commercial,52 Criminal,53 Human,54 and Public.55 Again, cases falling within two or more broad areas 
were placed in more than one category, for example Human and Public, or Human and Criminal. A 
relatively small number of cases were excluded altogether from this analysis: property/land/equity 
cases, which did not fall wholly or mainly into any of the four broad categories, and costs cases 
which we treated as sui generis. 
In addition to our analysis of decisions, we reviewed the Supreme Court website as at the 
end of the 2014-15 judicial year for information on extra-judicial speeches given by the Justices, and 
the Court’s Annual Reports up to 2014-15 for information on judges’ international visits. It must be 
acknowledged that neither of these sources is comprehensive. For example, overseas visits by 
individual Justices are listed separately in the Annual Reports, but the hosting of overseas visitors in 
the UK is not. The Supreme Court hosts a number of visits by international diplomats, ministers, 
lawyers and judges every year to establish or maintain links and exchange views on areas of law and 
good practice. However, it is not always clear from the Annual Reports whom they met when they 
were in the UK, making it impossible to attribute meetings consistently to individual Justices. This 
means that the picture of international outreach we have been able to glean is slightly unbalanced in 
favour of those Justices who are able and willing to travel, and may not include all international 
activities, although there is no reason to suspect any systematic exclusions from the Annual Reports. 
Further, the compilation of speeches on the Court’s website is dependent on judicial willingness to 
                                                          
52
  Comprising company, commercial, competition, consumer, contract, intellectual property, insolvency, insurance, 
restitution and tax law. 
53
  Comprising counter-terrorism, criminal law, criminal procedure, evidence, proceeds of crime and sentencing. 
54
  Comprising discrimination, employment, family, habeas corpus, housing, human rights, immigration/asylum, 
medical, occupational health and safety, privacy, probate, professional regulation, tort and welfare law. 
55
  Comprising administrative, constitutional, data protection, EU, environmental, FOI, international, planning and 
water law. 
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notify the Court’s information office and to have their speech posted online.56 Thus, it is not a full 
collection of all speeches given by all of the Justices. It is valuable, however, in giving an indication of 
the number and topics of speeches given by those Justices who are willing (or indeed keen) to 
publicise their speeches. Finally, we reviewed the Westlaw Legal Journals Index, the Hein Online 
database, the Index to Legal Periodicals, and the British Library catalogue up to February 2016 for 
books, book chapters and journal articles published by the Justices, both during their time on the 
Supreme Court and before and (where relevant) afterwards. We included in our review both 
professional and academic publications, and any kind of articles including case comments and book 
reviews. In addition to these activities, it should be noted that the Justices undertake many other 
external engagements such as visiting and speaking at schools and universities, professional 
gatherings, judging moots, and so forth, which do not feature in the Annual Reports or on the 
website or lead to publications. Nevertheless, the information that is publicly available provides a 
valuable insight into the formal and informal leadership roles adopted by the Justices. 
 
Administrative Leadership of the Court’s Adjudicative Function 
As noted above, the President and Deputy President of the UK Supreme Court have particular 
functions in relation to the conduct of the Court’s business, including approving the panels to sit on 
each case, presiding in cases, potentially allocating judgment-writing roles, and generally setting 
policies relating to the operation of the Court.57 They may also exercise a more persuasive influence 
over the Court’s decisions by virtue of their formal leadership role. During the period covered by our 
study, the Court had three different leadership regimes, consisting of Lord Phillips and Lord Hope 
                                                          
56
  Email from Ben Wilson, the UK Supreme Court’s Head of Communications, to Erika Rackley, 14 September 2015. 
57
  The President and Deputy President are appointed through an open appointments process (as set out in the CRA 
ss 25-31 and Sch 8) rather than the roles simply being allocated to the two most senior Justices. It is relatively uncommon 
to find a formal position of Deputy President in common law jurisdictions (in contrast to European constitutional courts), 
though, of course, this does not prevent strong systems of seniority operating on these courts outside formal roles. 
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(2009-12), Lord Neuberger and Lord Hope (2012-13) and Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale (2013-15).58 
We began by investigating the effects of these different leadership regimes, followed by patterns of 
presiding among the four court leaders. 
 
Leadership regimes 
We first asked whether assuming a formal leadership role on the Court resulted in any change in the 
types of judgments delivered. Lady Hale is the only judge for whom it was possible to test this 
question, since both Lord Phillips and Lord Hope were the President and Deputy President 
respectively during their entire tenure on the Supreme Court. And while Lord Neuberger did 
participate in several Supreme Court decisions before joining the Court as President in 2012,59 the 
number of judgments he delivered during this earlier period was too small to enable any meaningful 
comparison with his body of judgments since becoming President. By contrast, Lady Hale delivered 
137 judgments as a Justice and 79 as Deputy President up to the end of the 2014-15 judicial year, 
enabling statistical comparisons to be made between the two groups of judgments.  
There was no difference in the proportion of cases on which Lady Hale sat as a Justice and as 
Deputy President – she continued to sit on 54 per cent of cases which, as discussed below, is one of 
the highest proportions on the Court. However after she became Deputy President she was 
significantly more likely to give leading judgments (24 per cent single leads as Deputy President vs 11 
per cent single leads prior to becoming Deputy President), and was significantly less likely to dissent 
(three per cent single dissents as Deputy President vs eight per cent single dissents prior to 
                                                          
58
  It is notable that all of the Supreme Court’s formal leaders other than Lady Hale had previously held other formal 
judicial leadership roles. Lord Phillips was previously Lord Chief Justice, Lord Neuberger was Master of the Rolls and Lord 
Hope was Lord President of the Scottish judiciary. 
59
  Lord Neuberger was a member of the panel in six of the UKSC decisions issued in 2009. Although these cases 
have UKSC citations and therefore fall within the parameters of our study, they were heard in July 2009, before the formal 
establishment of the court, and therefore drew on the membership of the House of Lords. In addition, Lord Neuberger 
‘acted up’ in four UKSC cases while he was Master of the Rolls. 
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becoming Deputy President).60 This does suggest some form of jurisprudential leadership effect 
following from the assumption of formal leadership in Lady Hale’s case, in that she was more likely 
to take an authoritative role and more likely to have her views prevail as Deputy President. There 
were no differences in the types of cases coming before the court or on which Hale sat which might 
account for this change. Further testing of this phenomenon must await future changes to the 
composition of the Court and the assignment of formal leadership roles. But in any event, it appears 
likely to be related at least to some extent to the opportunities offered to the presiding Justice, 
discussed below, although Lady Hale’s leading judgments after she became Deputy President were 
as likely to be in cases in which she did not preside as in cases in which she did preside.61 
Secondly, we asked whether there were any discernible patterns of difference in the overall 
behaviour of the Court between leadership regimes. One difference that emerged was that the 
Court was significantly less likely to sit as an enlarged panel of seven or nine Justices under Lord 
Neuberger (12 per cent of cases) than under Lord Phillips (26 per cent of cases).62 Another was the 
                                                          
60
  Chi-square=26.820, df=10, p=0.003. The p value (<0.05) indicates that there was a statistically significant 
association between the independent and dependent variables (ie whether or not Hale was Deputy President and her 
proportion of single leads and dissents) rather than the difference being a product of random chance. As explained in the 
Methodology section above, a ‘single dissent’ means a dissent written individually rather than written jointly with another 
Justice. It does not indicate whether the particular Justice dissented alone or the court was split. In fact, there was no 
statistical difference between Lady Hale’s propensity to dissent alone or with other Justices before and after she became 
Deputy President, although statistical analysis was made difficult by the small number of cases involved. In numerical 
terms, 5 of her 11 single dissents prior to become Deputy President were dissents with others, while both of her 2 single 
dissents after becoming Deputy President were dissents with others. 
61
  Of the 20 leading judgments Lady Hale delivered as Deputy President, 10 were in cases in which she was the 
presider and 10 were in cases in which Lord Neuberger presided. 
62
  The criteria to be used when considering whether more than five Justices should sit on a panel are set out on 
the Supreme Court’s website: https://www.supremecourt.uk/procedures/panel-numbers-criteria.html. They are: If the 
Court is being asked to depart, or may decide to depart from a previous decision; a case of high constitutional 
importance; a case of great public importance; a case where a conflict between decisions in the House of Lords, Judicial 
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practice in relation to Judgments of the Court. Lord Phillips as President promoted Judgments of the 
Court as part of his desire to foster a ‘team’ ethos among the Justices,63 and such judgments were 
significantly more likely to be delivered when he was President than they have been since Lord 
Neuberger became President. Where the Court is unanimous, Lord Neuberger appears rather to 
favour the more traditional practice of a single leading judgment with which the other members of 
the Court agree. In relation to unanimity more generally, the Court was least likely to be unanimous 
when Lord Phillips was President (75 per cent of cases) and most likely to be unanimous under the 
Neuberger-Hope regime (82 per cent of cases), with the Neuberger-Hale regime falling between the 
two but closer to the former (77 per cent of cases). Even at its lowest, however, 75 per cent of cases 
is a relatively high rate of unanimity for an apex court in a common law jurisdiction.64 
Thirdly, we asked whether the Court leadership regime had any impact on the behaviour of 
individual Justices. It was again impossible to gauge this for those Justices who were members of the 
Court exclusively or almost exclusively during a single regime, that is, Lords Phillips, Saville, Rodger, 
Brown, Collins and Dyson (under Lord Phillips and Lord Hope), and Lords Hughes and Hodge (under 
Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale). For some Justices whose tenure on the court spanned two or three 
regimes, differences in their judgments over time appeared to be explained by reference to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Committee of the Privy Council and/or the Supreme Court has to be reconciled; or a case raising an important point in 
relation to the European Convention on Human Rights. It appears, however, that Lord Neuberger takes a narrower view 
than Lord Phillips as to when an enlarged panel is justified – though, of course, subsequent to our study period, he 
presided in R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union when the 
Court historically sat en banc for the first time. See also P Darbyshire ‘The UK Supreme Court – Is There Anything Left to 
Think About?’ (2015) 21(1) European Journal of Current Legal Issues pp 2-3. 
63
  Paterson (2013), above n 4, pp 141, 160. 
64
  Poole and Shah similarly show that the House of Lords was unanimous (on our definition) in 78% and 79% of their 
pre- and post-Human Rights Act samples respectively: above n 37, p 87. By comparison, see Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 
113, Table 3.7 which is labelled ‘Comparative dissent rates’ but in fact appears to show comparative unanimity rates. This 
shows the UK Supreme Court more likely to be unanimous than the US Supreme Court, the High Court of Australia and the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
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increasing seniority. Changes in Lady Hale’s judgments since she became Deputy President have 
been noted above. Lord Walker sat on fewer cases over time, as did Lord Mance and Lord Kerr.65 
Conversely, all of the cases in which Lord Mance and Lord Kerr presided occurred under the 
Neuberger-Hale regime. Lord Mance wrote more single concurrences under Phillips-Hope but more 
single leads under Neuberger-Hope, and similarly, Lord Kerr wrote more single concurrences under 
Phillips-Hope but more single leads under Neuberger-Hale. No differences between leadership 
regimes emerged for those Justices more recently appointed to the Supreme Court: Lords Reed, 
Carnwath and Toulson.  
Differences appeared for two Justices which could not be explained by their own increasing 
seniority. Lord Clarke moved from more single concurrences and single agreements under Phillips-
Hope to more joint concurrences and joint agreements under Neuberger-Hale. Interestingly, all of 
those joint concurrences were with Lord Neuberger and/or Lady Hale, and a high proportion of the 
joint agreements were either with Lord Neuberger and/or Lady Hale, or were in cases in which Lord 
Neuberger or Lady Hale wrote the leading judgment. Moreover, Lord Clarke sat on a significantly 
lower percentage of cases in his specialist area of contract/commercial law and a significantly higher 
                                                          
65
  One possible explanation for these declines is that as Justices become more senior, they prefer to sit – and 
preside – in the Privy Council rather than sitting on the Supreme Court where they do not have the opportunity to preside. 
However, after reviewing Privy Council cases from October 2009 – July 2015, this hypothesis proved not to be persuasive. 
During the period of our study the Privy Council decided 237 cases, with the Justices sitting on an average of 39% of the 
Privy Council cases decided during their tenure. Lord Walker sat on a lower than average proportion of Privy Council cases 
during the period; Lord Mance has sat on a high proportion of Privy Council cases, but he has done so uniformly since 2011; 
the number of Privy Council cases on which Lord Kerr has sat has fluctuated from year to year without any noticeable 
upward trajectory. Moreover, opportunities for presiding for more senior judges have not been much more available on 
the Privy Council than on the Supreme Court. The President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court have presided in 
the majority of Privy Council cases (Lord Phillips: 50, Lord Hope: 43, Lord Neuberger: 40, Lady Hale: 32). Lord Mance is the 
only Justice to have presided in a significant number of cases outside this group (27). So while Lord Mance has sat on a 
higher proportion of Privy Council than of Supreme Court cases, this has not always been because of the opportunity to 
preside. 
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percentage of cases in his non-specialist areas of housing, medical and welfare law under 
Neuberger-Hale than under Phillips-Hope. This may account for a greater inclination to join with 
other Justices rather than to write single concurrences. What is unknown is whether this change in 
the mix of cases on which he sat was a product of Lord Clarke’s own choice, or that of Lord 
Neuberger and Lady Hale as presiding Justices (see further the discussions of presiding and 
specialisation below). 
In cases in which the Court was not unanimous, Lord Wilson was significantly more likely to 
be in the majority under Phillips-Hope, but significantly more likely to be in the minority under 
Neuberger-Hale. This appeared to be related to the observed change in Lady Hale’s judgments 
following her appointment as Deputy President. Lady Hale and Lord Wilson sit together relatively 
frequently, as they both specialise in family law and in our broad category of ‘Human’ cases. In total, 
Lady Hale and Lord Wilson sat together on 23 cases in which the Court was divided. In only six of 
those cases were they on the same side, and four of those six were decided under the leadership of 
Lords Phillips and Hope. It may be, therefore, that as Lady Hale assumed greater jurisprudential 
leadership within the Court, Lord Wilson’s difference of view was more likely to consign him to a 
minority position. 
 
Presiding 
The presiding Justice is always the most senior Justice sitting on the case, who may be but is not 
necessarily the President or Deputy President. In fact, of the 402 cases in our database, only 37 
(fewer than 10 per cent) had a Justice other than the current President or Deputy President 
presiding.66 Clearly, therefore, the practice on the Supreme Court is for the roles of President and 
Deputy President to include chairing the Court’s hearing panels. The Justices other than the 
President and Deputy President who presided in the largest numbers of cases were Lord Walker in 
                                                          
66
  The majority of these were from England and Wales, with only five from Scotland and two from Northern Ireland. 
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11 cases and Lord Mance in nine cases.67 These cases have been excluded from the following 
analysis.  
Of the remaining 365 cases, Lord Phillips presided in 77, Lord Hope in 108, Lord Neuberger in 
139 and Lady Hale in 41. The number of cases in which Lady Hale presided is clearly much lower than 
those of her colleagues. This may be explained by the fact that Lords Phillips and Neuberger as 
President sat together with their Deputy President Lord Hope fairly rarely (in 12 per cent and 13 per 
cent of cases respectively), with the result that Lord Hope presided in almost all the cases on which 
he sat. The same is not true, however, for Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale. Lord Neuberger as 
President has sat with Lady Hale as Deputy President on over a quarter of the cases decided under 
their leadership (28 per cent), thus providing her with fewer opportunities to preside. As indicated 
above, this was not a function of the President and Deputy President tending to sit together on 
enlarged panels, since these have occurred less often under Lord Neuberger than under Lord 
Phillips. In fact, both Lord Phillips and Lord Neuberger tended to sit with Lord Hope only on enlarged 
panels, while Lord Neuberger has sat with Lady Hale both on enlarged panels and on panels 
composed of five Justices.  
The opportunity or otherwise to preside is highly significant. In Final Appeal, Gavin Drewry 
and Louis Blom-Cooper wrote that ‘The presiding judge (even in a judicial system founded on 
separate judgments) can exercise considerable influence over the course of argument presented to 
the Court, and may even play a disproportionate part in drafting the final decision’.68 Indeed, 
Paterson suggests Lord Phillips thought that the President ought to write the lion’s share of lead 
                                                          
67
  As noted at n 61 above, the same pattern, albeit to a less extreme degree, prevailed in the Privy Council. In that 
court, a Justice other than the President or Deputy President presided in 30% of cases, with Lord Mance in the lead (27 
cases), followed by Lords Rodger (12), Walker (10) and Kerr (10). 
68
  L Blom-Cooper and G Drewry Final Appeal – A Study of the House of Lords in its Judicial Capacity (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1972) p 179. 
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judgments.69 In fact, however, Lord Phillips wrote the lead judgment70 in only 30 per cent of the 
cases in which he presided. It was Lord Hope who appeared to take the lion’s share doctrine most 
seriously, writing the lead judgment in 42 per cent of the cases in which he presided. This level of 
leading has not been emulated by either Lord Neuberger (22 per cent leads when presiding) or Lady 
Hale (27 per cent leads when presiding). It does, however, appear that the view of the presiding 
judge as to the outcome of the case almost always prevails. Lord Phillips’ dissent rate as presider 
was three per cent; Lord Neuberger’s and Lady Hale’s is just two per cent. Again, it was Lord Hope 
who exercised the greatest degree of control over outcomes. He was never in the minority in any of 
the cases in which he presided.  
In terms of the ability to go one step further and produce unanimity as a presiding Justice, 
Lady Hale has had the greatest success. The Court was unanimous in 69 per cent of cases in which 
Lord Phillips presided, 74 per cent of cases in which Lord Neuberger presided, 82 per cent of cases in 
which Lord Hope presided, and 85 per cent of cases in which Lady Hale presided. Although the 
number of cases in which Lord Phillips and Lord Neuberger did not preside is too small to enable 
statistical analysis, there was a statistically significant difference in the level of unanimity when both 
Lord Hope and Lady Hale were presiding compared to when they were not presiding. This may be 
explained, however, by the fact that the President presides in most cases with an enlarged panel, 
which by their nature (and statistically) are more likely to produce split decisions, whereas the 
Deputy President more often presides over regular panels of five Justices which are more likely to be 
unanimous. 
Yet it is also notable that when Lady Hale wrote the leading judgment, the Court was more 
likely to be unanimous than when she did not write the leading judgment. This was not true for 
Lords Phillips, Hope or Neuberger. And indeed, this phenomenon held true throughout the entire 
period of the study, not only since Lady Hale became Deputy President. It might be hypothesised 
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  Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 160. 
70
  ‘Lead judgments’ here is an aggregate of single leads, joint leads and reading the Judgment of the Court. 
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that when Lady Hale writes the leading judgment it is likely to be in her specialist area of family law, 
and therefore the rest of the Court is more likely to defer to her expertise. But further analysis 
suggests this is not a convincing explanation. All four of the Court’s Presidents and Deputy 
Presidents have written a number of leading judgments in their specialist areas (for example, Lord 
Neuberger in intellectual property and property law more generally), all have written leading 
judgments in human rights cases (the largest area of the Court’s workload), and all have written 
leading judgments outside their specialist areas. Overall, Lady Hale has written leading judgments in 
18 different subject areas, compared to 19 for Lord Neuberger, 17 for Lord Hope, and nine for Lord 
Phillips. The unanimity effect when Lady Hale writes the leading judgment does not appear, 
therefore, to be a function of her particular specialisation. It may reflect her desire, when writing a 
leading judgment, to seek consensus as far as possible,71 and therefore to make an effort to write 
judgments with which the other members of the court can agree.  
The presider is also influential in determining the opportunities available to other Justices 
through selection of who writes the leading judgment. Lords Phillips and Hope chose who would 
write the leading judgment (or the Judgment of the Court) if it was not themselves, even if they 
were in the minority.72 The same remains true under the current Neuberger-Hale regime, though 
Lord Neuberger suggests that the decision is, at least in part, dictated by a desire to ensure that 
judgment writing is split equally between the Justices both in terms of quantity of judgments and 
judgments in ‘interesting cases’.73 We therefore looked to see whether there were any differences in 
the proportion of leading judgments written by other Justices according to who was presiding in the 
case, or any other differences by presider. In fact, very little emerged. Only three Justices wrote 
different proportions of leading judgments under different presiders – Lady Hale (more leads with 
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  Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 135. 
72
  Ibid, p 160. 
73
  Lord Neuberger, ‘Tweaking the Curial Veil’, The Blackstone Lecture 2014, Pembroke College, Oxford, 15 
November 2014 [28]. 
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Lord Hope than with Lord Phillips, and when she herself was presiding); Lord Kerr (more leads with 
Lords Hope and Neuberger than with Lord Phillips or Lady Hale); and Lord Clarke (more leads with 
Lord Phillips than with Lord Hope or Lady Hale). The identity of the presider appeared to make no 
difference to the proportion of leading judgments written by Lords Saville, Rodger, Walker, Brown, 
Collins, Reed, Toulson or Hodge. Where differences were found, they tended to relate not to the 
type of judgments written, but rather to whether the Justice sat on the Court at all. 
Paterson explains that draft panels for cases are prepared by the Registrar of the Supreme 
Court, taking into account expertise and workload. These are then submitted to the President and 
Deputy President for approval. In general, Lords Phillips and Neuberger have usually accepted the 
Registrar’s suggestions, whereas Lord Hope made changes from time to time.74 Our data showed 
that when Lord Phillips was presiding, Lords Mance, Kerr, Clarke and Wilson were more likely to sit 
on the case. When Lord Hope was presiding, Lords Kerr and Carnwath were more likely to sit on the 
case, but Lady Hale and Lords Mance, Clarke and Sumption were less likely to do so. When Lord 
Neuberger presided, Lords Mance, Clarke and Sumption were more likely to sit on the case, but Lady 
Hale (by virtue of being Deputy President), Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson were less likely to do. When 
Lady Hale presided, Lords Wilson and Hughes were more likely to sit on the case, but Lords Clarke, 
Sumption and Carnwath were less likely to do so. The most likely explanation for these patterns lies 
in different judicial expertise and specialisation, in line with Paterson’s account. In relation to the 
current Court leadership regime, for example, Lord Neuberger broadly tends to preside in 
commercial cases while Lady Hale tends to preside in non-commercial cases. The issue of 
specialisation is discussed further below.  
 In summary, different leadership regimes have made small but significant differences to 
judicial behaviour on the Supreme Court. Lady Hale has been most likely to produce unanimity as a 
presider. She is also more likely to write the leading judgment and less likely to dissent since she 
became Deputy President. More generally, writing the leading judgment and having one’s opinion of 
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  Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 72. See also Gee et al, above n 31, p 199. 
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the outcome of the case prevail are prerogatives of the presider – a role most likely to be taken by 
the President or Deputy President. Lord Hope took the greatest advantage of these prerogatives, 
writing the leading judgment in almost half of the cases in which he presided, and never being in the 
minority in those cases. Moreover, Lord Hope was given greater opportunity to preside by both Lord 
Phillips and Lord Neuberger than was Lady Hale by Lord Neuberger.  
With regards to the other Justices who have served on the Court under the different 
leadership regimes, Lords Mance and Kerr have gained greater opportunities over time to write 
leading judgments and to act as presider. The mix of cases on which Lord Clarke sits has changed, 
which has in turn produced a change from more individualist to more collective judgment writing. In 
cases in which the Court is not unanimous, Lord Wilson and Lady Hale tend to be on opposite sides, 
with the consequence that as Lady Hale has moved over time from a more to a less frequent 
dissenter, Lord Wilson has moved in the opposite direction. 
 
Jurisprudential Leadership 
The existing literature tends to focus on the writing of leading judgments as the primary evidence of 
jurisprudential leadership. McCormick has gone further and investigated the writing of leading 
judgments in ‘important’ cases, with ‘importance’ being assessed by reference to the frequency with 
which those judgments are cited in the court’s subsequent decisions.75 In line with our concern to 
explore the multiple dimensions of judicial leadership, we have taken a more expansive view of 
jurisprudential leadership. First, since the UK Supreme Court (unlike other apex courts in the 
common law world) does not sit en banc, the sheer presence of a Justice on the panel and therefore 
contributing to judicial conversations in a high proportion of cases may constitute a form of 
leadership. Secondly, as well as leading judgments, the writing of concurrences and dissents may be 
seen as a form of jurisprudential leadership, as the Justice articulates alternative reasoning which 
                                                          
75
  P McCormick ‘Who Writes? Gender and Judgment Assignment on the Supreme Court of Canada’ (2013) 51(2) 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 595. 
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represents a particular point of view and/or which may later be taken up by others. This point is 
elaborated below, but at this stage, rather than simply focusing on leading judgments, we are 
interested in the distinction between writing a substantive judgment and simple agreement. Thirdly, 
another form of jurisprudential leadership may be found in the fact of specialisation.76 Almost all of 
the Supreme Court Justices specialise in particular areas of law (Lady Hale and Lord Wilson in family 
law, Lords Mance and Sumption in commercial law, Lord Carnwath in environmental law, to name 
obvious examples), and thus they may distinguish themselves as ‘thought’ leaders in a specific area 
or areas of law rather than across the board.77 They may also specialise at a jurisdictional level (the 
Scottish and Northern Irish Justices, for example, although this is something that needs to be 
investigated rather than assumed). Alternatively, leadership may be evidenced by being a generalist 
rather than a specialist.  In line with most of the literature, however, we assess jurisprudential 
leadership by reference to substantive decisions in appeals coming before the Court.78  
 
Sitting on Cases 
Lady Hale has contributed to more Supreme Court decisions than any other serving or retired 
Supreme Court Justice. She participated in 216 of the 402 decisions issued by the Court during the 
period of our study. Lord Clarke participated in the next highest number of decisions: 176 (40 fewer 
                                                          
76
  Cf Lord Sumption’s recently expressed view that ‘legal specialisations are essentially bogus’ and ‘it is all just law’: 
‘Family Law at a Distance’, speech given at the ‘At a Glance’ Conference, Royal College of Surgeons, 8 June 2016. 
77
  However, as Lord Sumption also notes, although ‘[t]here will usually be at least one specialist on the appeal panel 
… his or her voice will not necessarily be decisive’: ibid. 
78
  A further way in which a Justice may exercise jurisprudential leadership is in influencing the nature of the court’s 
caseload through the granting (and refusal) of permissions to appeal (PTA). Analysis of permissions to appeal was beyond 
the scope of the current research. Chris Hanretty has shown the number of PTA decisions made and comparative 
permission rates among the Supreme Court Justices up to an unspecified date in 2013, but did not discuss the subject-
matter of the permissions. See ‘Permission to appeal decisions in the UKSC’ available at 
http://chrishanretty.co.uk/blog/index.php/2014/11/13/permission-to-appeal-decisions-in-the-uksc/. 
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than Lady Hale), while the remaining serving Justices appointed in the first tranche of appointments 
to the Supreme Court, Lords Mance and Kerr, participated in 156 decisions and 166 decisions 
respectively.79  
The ordering changes somewhat when allowance is made for the period of time spent on 
the Court. Here Lord Neuberger emerged at the top of the list, having participated in 64 per cent of 
the decisions issued during his time on the Court. He is followed by Lord Brown (59 per cent, though 
only 94 decisions), Lord Hope (57 per cent) and then Lady Hale (54 per cent). Almost all of the 
remaining Justices have participated in a similar proportion of decisions, around 44 per cent, with 
the exception of Lord Saville, whose duties on the Bloody Sunday Inquiry meant that he participated 
in only 22 per cent of decisions during his time on the Court.80  Lord Neuberger and Lord Hope’s 
figures are clearly a reflection of their formal leadership roles on the Court, although it is notable 
that the same was not true for Lord Phillips, who participated in just 42 per cent of the decisions 
issued during his time as President (a mere 77 decisions in total).81 Lady Hale’s figures are not 
entirely due to her position as Deputy President, since she has participated in the same high 
percentage of decisions throughout her time on the Court. The high figure for Lord Brown is less 
                                                          
79
  It should be noted that the number of Supreme Court decisions in which a Justice participated is not necessarily 
an indicator of total workload. Supreme Court Justices also sit on the Privy Council. Lords Clarke (93), Mance (111) and Kerr 
(91) have sat on more Privy Council cases than Lady Hale (69). In addition, two Justices sit on the Court of Final  
Appeal in Hong Kong for up to a month each year. According to the Court’s Annual Reports, to date Lords Clarke, Walker 
and Neuberger have undertaken this role. However, our focus here is on the number of Supreme Court cases, as this is an 
indicator of presence and hence of some kind of influence on the Court which determines the law of the UK.  
80
  Lord Brown also sat on the highest proportion of Privy Council cases during our study period (58%). Other 
Justices sitting on higher than average proportions of Privy Council cases were Lords Toulson, Mance, Wilson, Dyson, 
Sumption and Hodge. By contrast, Lord Hope sat on 28% of Privy Council cases and Lady Hale sat on 29%. 
81
  In this context, it is interesting to note that while Lord Hope and Lord Neuberger sat on a much lower proportion 
of Privy Council cases (28% and 35% respectively) than of Supreme Court cases, Lord Phillips sat on similar proportions of 
cases on both courts (41% of Privy Council cases). 
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explicable.82 It may be that he was more available to sit than other Justices and/or was well-liked as 
a panellist, possibly reflecting his social leadership role on the Court identified by Paterson. 
 
Types of Judgments 
In terms of authorship of leading judgments,83 our data shows that Lord Hope and Lord Phillips took 
the role of the Court’s intellectual leaders at the outset by virtue of their formal leadership positions. 
Lord Hope has the highest proportion of leading judgments of any Justice who has sat on the 
Supreme Court, authoring the leading judgment in 35 per cent of his cases, with Lord Phillips leading 
in 30 per cent of his cases. Among the other Justices, Lords Toulson and Sumption emerged with the 
highest proportions of leading judgments during the period of our study, writing the leading 
judgment in 26 per cent and 25 per cent of their cases respectively.84 It is unsurprising that newer 
members of the Court should have higher proportions of leading judgments than more senior 
members, since the newer members have spent more time on the Court under a leadership regime 
which has given them the opportunity to write leading judgments, rather than reserving that role 
largely to themselves. In this sense, Lord Neuberger’s leadership as President and Lady Hale’s as 
Deputy President have been more egalitarian in sharing leading judgments and have therefore 
opened up possibilities for more junior members of the Court which were not previously available.85 
The smallest proportions of leading judgments were given by Lord Rodger (eight per cent) and Lord 
Kerr (10 per cent). As will be seen below, these were the two Justices with the highest dissent rates. 
                                                          
82
  And even less explicable considering that, as noted above (n 76), he also sat on the highest proportion of Privy 
Council cases. 
83
  As noted earlier, this includes both single leads and reading the Judgment of the Court. 
84
  Lord Toulson also wrote a high proportion of leading judgments in the Privy Council (29%), although Lord 
Sumption’s proportion of leading judgments in the Privy Council was much lower (13%). 
85
  As noted by Lord Neuberger himself: above n 73, [28]. 
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Elliot Slotnick has suggested that frequent dissenters are given fewer leads as ‘an apparent implicit 
outsider tax’.86 This may well have occurred in the cases of Lords Rodger and Kerr.87 
 Opinion on the value and desirability of concurring judgments is divided. Those opposed to 
concurrences argue that they ‘serve only to fudge areas of real agreement’ and are ‘insidious to … 
clarity and certainty in the law’,88 while a single lead or majority opinion provides ‘a coherent and 
certain statement of the law’.89 Arguments in favour of concurrences or multiple judgments include 
respect for individual opinions,90 avoidance of single judgments appearing more authoritative than 
they actually are and thus straight-jacketing subsequent decisions,91 the value of having different 
viewpoints or perspectives expressed on difficult issues,92 the prompting of ‘useful discussion’ with 
academics and other judges as to how the law on a particular topic should be taken forward,93 
support for judicial independence,94 acting as a reminder that litigation is not only about outcomes 
but also about reasoning, and demonstrating judicial engagement with the case not only by the lead 
opinion writer.95  
                                                          
86
  E Slotnick ‘Who Speaks for the Court? Majority Opinion Assignment from Taft to Burger’ (1979) 23(1) Am J Pol Sci 
60, p 63, cited in McCormick, above n 75, p 608. 
87
  See also Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 160. 
88
  Blom-Cooper and Drewry, above n 68, p 93, cited in Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 100. 
89
  Paterson (2013), ibid, p 104. See also Carnwath LJ in Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2006] EWCA Civ 1739 
[62]; Darbyshire, above n 62, pp 4-8.  
90
  Paterson (2013) attributes this view to Lord Reid: above n 4, pp 99, 101. See also JD Heydon, ‘Threats to Judicial 
Independence: The Enemy Within’ [2013] LQR 205. 
91
 Paterson (2013), ibid, p 101. 
92
  Paterson (2013) attributes this view to Lord Phillips: ibid, p 104. See also S Gageler, ‘Why Write Judgments?’ 
(2014) 36 Syd L Rev 189, p 203. 
93
  Lord Neuberger, above n 73, [22] 
94
  Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 104; Heydon, above n 90. 
95
  R Munday, ‘Judicial Configurations’ (2002) 61 CLJ 612, cited in Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 109. 
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In between are qualified views. For example Lord Phillips, who was generally in favour of 
multiple opinions, nevertheless thought that in the interpretation of criminal statutes it was 
necessary for the Court to speak with one voice to provide a single authoritative statement which 
could be applied in practice.96 Lady Hale who, according to Paterson, is generally in favour of single 
lead or majority opinions, nevertheless will write a concurrence where she is ‘seeking to put a 
particular point of view on the record which it is unreasonable to expect to be included in the 
majority judgment’.97 Lord Neuberger in his 2012 Bailii lecture also declared himself a qualified 
opponent of multiple judgments, noting that self-restraint is a judicial virtue and asserting that 
concurrences should only be written when they really add something to the leading judgment – that 
is, when the topic would really benefit from judicial dialogue rather than the clarity achieved by a 
single lead or majority judgment.98 
 In fact, as James Lee has observed, concurrences may perform a variety of functions, 
including ‘buttressing’ (supporting the leading judgment), ‘mediating’ (delineating the common 
ground between the other judgments) and ‘dissenting’ (agreeing with the result but for what 
Paterson might identify as ‘radically’ different reasons).99 A curious example of an arguably 
dissenting – or certainly non-buttressing – concurrence is Lord Brown’s judgment in Yemshaw v 
London Borough of Hounslow,100 in which, after expressing at some length his ‘profound doubt’ as to 
the interpretation of the Housing Act 1996 adopted by the other members of the Court,101 he 
concluded that 
                                                          
96
 Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 104. 
97
 Ibid, p 108. 
98
  Lord Neuberger, ‘First Annual Bailii Lecture: No Judgment – No Justice’, 20 November 2012 [11]-[13].  
99
  J Lee ‘A Defence of Concurring Speeches’ [2009] PL 305. 
100
  Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow [2011] UKSC 3. 
101
  Ibid [48]. 
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at the end of the day … I do not feel sufficiently strongly as to the proper outcome of the 
appeal to carry these doubts to the point of dissent. I am content that the views of the 
majority should prevail and that the appeal should be allowed.102  
Paterson found that those Supreme Court Justices who favoured multiple judgments – Lords 
Hope, Brown, Rodger and Mance – wrote more concurrences, while those in favour of single 
majority judgments (with the exception of Lord Dyson) wrote fewer concurrences.103 Extending the 
period covered by Paterson, we found similarly that the highest proportion of concurrences was 
written by Lord Brown (in 38 per cent of his cases) followed closely by Lord Rodger (in 37 per cent). 
The next highest proportions were written by Lord Collins (in 35 per cent) and Lord Dyson (in 34 per 
cent). Among the Justices currently sitting on the Supreme Court, Lord Mance had the highest 
proportion of concurrences (30 per cent). By contrast, the lowest proportions of concurrences were 
written by newer Justices – Lord Wilson (in nine per cent of his cases) and Lord Hodge (in 10 per 
cent). It is perhaps not coincidental that the highest proportions of concurrences were written by 
Justices who served primarily under a President and Deputy President (Phillips-Hope) who were both 
pro-multiple judgments and wrote many of the leading judgments themselves. Justices serving 
under the Neuberger-Hale leadership regime are in the opposite position, with both President and 
Deputy President favouring single majority judgments and more willing to share those judgments 
around. 
 Similar arguments have been advanced for and against dissenting judgments. Argument in 
favour of such judgments include the value of demonstrating a different way of thinking about the 
issues in the case; providing an opportunity for judges (and academics and students) to debate and 
analyse the merits of alternative approaches; identifying the limits of the majority decision; laying 
                                                          
102
  Ibid [60]. 
103
  Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 108.  
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the groundwork for future legal development; and strengthening judicial independence.104 Erika 
Rackley contends that the persuasive success of a dissenting judgment lies in its ‘ability to challenge 
the majority’s story and weaken its hold on our collective imagination’.105 It has also been observed 
that a dissenting opinion can have an impact in shaping the leading or majority judgment.106 For 
example Paterson notes that in some cases such as R v Waya,107 ‘dissents are very hard-fought 
statements that have shifted the majority to tighter ground which will be more defensible in the 
future’.108 In such cases, he concludes, ‘the dissent has played a major and successful part in the 
judicial dialogue’.109 
It is clear, too, that individual judges hold different views about the desirability or otherwise 
of dissenting. Paterson, for example, contrasts the view of Lord Kerr, who thought that if he felt the 
decision was wrong he should not shirk from writing a dissent, with that of Lord Wilson, who 
thought he should only dissent if he felt very strongly about the majority decision, at the level of 
being unable to live with it.110 ‘Great dissenters’ such as Justice Kirby on the High Court of Australia 
or Justice L’Heureux-Dubé on the Supreme Court of Canada dissented at rates substantially above 
                                                          
104
  C L’Heureux-Dubé ‘The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future?’ (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 495, pp 
496, 508, 511-513; C Sparks ‘Justice L’Heureux-Dubé: Dimensions of a Quintessential Judicial Leader’ in E Sheehy (ed) 
Adding Feminism to Law: The Contributions of Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2004) p 382; B Hale 
‘Maccabaean Lecture in Jurisprudence: A Minority Opinion?’ (2008) 154 Proceedings of the British Academy 319; Paterson 
(2013), above n 4, pp 111-112; MC Belleau and R Johnson ‘Les femmes juges feront-elles véritablement une différence? 
Réflexions sur leur présence depuis vingt ans à la Cour suprême du Canada’ (2005) 17 CJWL 27, pp 30-31, 36; E Rackley 
‘Difference in the House of Lords’ (2006) 15(2) Social and Legal Studies 163; E Rackley Women, Judging and the Judiciary: 
From Difference to Diversity (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013) chs 5 and 6. 
105
  Rackley (2006), ibid, p 181. 
106
  Belleau et al, above n 38, p 79. 
107
  R v Waya [2012] UKSC 51. 
108
  Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 110. 
109
  Ibid. 
110
  Ibid, p 117. 
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those of their colleagues, or indeed of any UK Justice.111 Dissent is also, obviously, a relational 
exercise, depending on the range of views represented on the court at any given time.112  For 
example, Paterson shows Lord Rodger’s and Lord Brown’s dissent rates going up in the transition 
from the House of Lords to the Supreme Court, while Lord Mance’s dissent rate went down.113  
According to Paterson, Lord Phillips as President saw little point in dissenting on his own,114 
although it is not clear that this view was or is widely shared, since overall, there were almost as 
many single dissents in our database (41, 10 per cent of cases) as split decisions where two or more 
members of the Court dissented (52, 13 per cent of cases). The Justices with the highest proportions 
of dissents during our study period were Lord Rodger (10 per cent) and (interestingly given his 
comment to Paterson) Lord Wilson (nine per cent). If part concurrence-part dissents are added, 
those with the highest (partial) dissent rates were Lord Rodger and Lord Kerr (13 per cent each), 
followed by Lady Hale (12 per cent), and Lords Carnwath and Brown (11 per cent each). By contrast, 
                                                          
111
  Justice Kirby’s dissent rate ranged from 26% to 48% in any given year, and on average, he dissented in around 
one third of his cases on the High Court: Lynch, above n 34, p 516; A Lynch and G Williams ‘The High Court on 
Constitutional Law: The 2003 Statistics’ (2004) 27(1) UNSWLJ 88, p 93; A Lynch and G Williams The High Court on 
Constitutional Law: The 2004 Statistics’ (2005) 28(1) UNSWLJ 14, p 19; A Lynch and G Williams ‘The High Court on 
Constitutional Law: The 2005 Statistics’ (2006) 29(2) UNSWLJ 182, p 190; A Lynch and G Williams ‘The High Court on 
Constitutional Law: The 2006 Statistics’ (2007) 30(1) UNSWLJ 188, p 196; A Lynch and G Williams ‘The High Court on 
Constitutional Law: The 2007 Statistics’ (2008) 31(1) UNSWLJ 238, p 245; A Lynch and G Williams ‘The High Court on 
Constitutional Law: The 2008 Statistics’ (2009) 32(1) UNSWLJ 181, p 188. Note, though, that this is according to Lynch and 
Williams’ definition of ‘dissent’, outlined above, which would tend to inflate their figures. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé dissented 
in 37% of her cases in 1984-1990, and in 32% in 1990-99: Belleau and Johnson, above n 104. 
112
  See eg, in relation to Justice Kirby, A Lynch ‘Does the High Court Disagree More Often in Constitutional Cases? A 
Statistical Study of Judgment Delivery 1981-2003’ (2005) 33(3) Fed L Rev 485, p 509; and in relation to Australian High 
Court Justice Dyson Heydon, Lynch and Williams ‘The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 2012 Statistics’ (2013) 36(2) 
UNSWLJ 514, pp 522, 529 and A Lynch and G Williams ‘The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 2011 Statistics’ (2012) 
35(3) UNSWLJ 846, p 855. 
113
  Paterson (2013), above n 4, p 118. 
114
  Ibid, p 163. 
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Lord Saville never dissented on the Supreme Court and neither did Lord Dyson or Lord Hughes, 
although Lord Hughes had one and Lord Dyson two part concurrence-part dissents. Lords Collins 
dissented only once. 
In the majority of cases in which a Justice dissented, they wrote a separate judgment rather 
than simply agreeing with another member of the minority (or writing a joint dissent, which 
occurred in only one case, by Lords Sumption and Reed). The comparative judgment types among 
the current Supreme Court Justices are set out in Table 1.115 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
It can be seen that the current Justice who wrote the most, in whatever form, was Lord Mance by 
quite a large margin (writing in 59 per cent of his cases), followed by Lady Hale (writing in 49 per 
cent of her cases).  At the other end of the spectrum, Lord Wilson and Lord Hughes wrote the least 
(writing in only 31 and 32 per cent of their cases respectively). Lord Hughes also contributed fairly 
low proportions of leading judgments and dissents, perhaps marking him out, at least on the 
Supreme Court, as a ‘great agree-er’.116 
 
Specialisation 
Most Justices of the Supreme Court ‘specialise’ in a particular area or areas of law.117 We measured 
specialisation in two ways: whether a Justice was more likely to sit on some types of cases than 
                                                          
115
  Note that although Lord Toulson retired from the Court in September 2016, we have included him among the list 
of current Justices, because he was still sitting on the Court at the end of our study period and had not been replaced at 
the time of writing. He also continues to sit as a member of the ‘supplementary panel’.  
116
  By contrast, Lord Hughes wrote the highest proportion of judgments in the Privy Council of all the currently 
sitting Justice (in 43% of his cases), surpassed only by Lord Walker (47%). But Lord Wilson wrote a judgment in a slightly 
lower than average proportion of his Privy Council cases (22%). 
117
  Indeed, the Information Pack for the current Supreme Court vacancies recognises this, noting that ‘subject to the 
overriding principle of selection by merit, the appointment panel will wish to ensure as far as possible that there is an 
appropriate balance of expertise within the Court’ (above n 2, p 4). 
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others, and whether a Justice was more likely to write a leading judgment in some types of cases 
than others. In terms of individual subject areas, the areas with 20 or more cases in our database 
were human rights (87 cases),118 EU law (52 cases), tort (37 cases), contract/commercial (36 cases), 
immigration/asylum (34 cases), civil procedure (33 cases), criminal procedure (32 cases), 
property/land/equity (30 cases), family (29 cases), employment (26 cases) and tax (25 cases). 
Specialisations in these areas among the current Justices of the Supreme Court, as measured by 
significantly greater likelihood of sitting on cases and writing leading judgments in that area, are set 
out in Table 2.  
[insert Table 2 about here] 
 It can be seen that each of these areas has at least one currently-serving Justice who is more 
likely to sit on such cases, although none of the current Justices is significantly more likely to write a 
leading judgment in the areas of human rights or criminal procedure. Lord Hope was a leading 
judgment-writer in both of these areas, but it appears that since his retirement, leading judgments 
in these two areas are spread more evenly among the Justices. Those areas with the greatest 
numbers of currently-serving Justices likely to sit consistently are criminal procedure, family law and 
tax. Given that human rights constitutes by far the largest category of cases in the Court’s caseload, 
the fact that two Justices (Lords Sumption and Carnwarth) are in fact significantly less likely to sit on 
such cases is somewhat surprising. 
Among the current Justices, it is also notable that four do not have at least one area of 
specialisation as measured by either sitting or leading judgment-writing among the areas covered in 
Table 2. These are Lords Neuberger, Sumption, Toulson and Hughes.  In terms of sitting on cases, 
Lord Neuberger acts as a generalist – a point clearly related to the fact that he sits on a considerably 
higher proportion of all cases than any of the other Justices. However he does write leading 
judgments more frequently on civil procedure and property/land/equity (and also in the small 
                                                          
118
  For discussion of the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on the caseload of the House of Lords, see S Shah and 
T Poole ‘The Impact of the Human Rights Act on the House of Lords’ [2009] PL 347; Poole and Shah, above n 37. 
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number of intellectual property cases which reach the Court). Lords Sumption and Toulson do not 
have specialist areas in which they are more likely to write leading judgments, which appears to be 
related to the fact that they are the most frequent writers of leading judgments on the Court. Lord 
Hughes also does not have a specialist area in which he is more likely to write leading judgments. In 
his case, this – together with his low proportion of leading judgments overall – may be explained by 
the fact that the areas in which he is more likely to sit – criminal procedure and family law – are 
populated by more senior subject specialists or more prolific writers of leading judgments. 
In terms of our broad categories of cases (as described in the Methodology section, above), 
the most frequently occurring were Human cases (229) followed by Public (129 cases), Commercial 
(100 cases), and finally Criminal (55 cases). The results in terms of sitting and writing leading 
judgments among the current Justices of the Supreme Court are set out in Table 3. 
[insert Table 3 about here] 
On this analysis, it is interesting to note that none of the current Supreme Court Justices are 
more likely than others to sit on Public law cases, although Lord Carnwath is more likely to write 
leading judgments in this broad area. Lords Reed and Hodge join Lord Neuberger as generalists, 
being neither more likely to sit nor more likely to write leading judgments in any of the broad 
areas.119 Lord Kerr is not specialised in any of the broad areas in terms of writing leading judgments, 
although here, Lord Hughes does emerge as a specialist in criminal law.  
More broadly still, Lady Hale’s jurisprudential leadership in cases raising gender issues has 
been the subject of extensive discussion.120 On a preliminary classification of cases as actually or 
                                                          
119
  This may be consistent with Brodie’s claim, relying on Stevens, that Scots Law Lords (and by extension Supreme 
Court Justices) are distinct because of the nature of their practice at the Bar before judicial appointment: while English 
barristers tend to be specialists, Scots barristers are generalists (even if leaders of the profession): PH Brodie ‘Scotland 
after 1707’ in Blom-Cooper and Drewry (eds), above n 68, p 289. 
120
  See eg Rackley (2006), (2013), above n 104; E Rackley ‘Detailing Judicial Difference’ (2009) 17(1) Fem L S 11.  
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potentially raising feminist or gender issues,121 we found that Lady Hale, together with Lord Wilson, 
was indeed significantly more likely than other Justices both to sit on and to write the leading 
judgment in such cases. The conjunction with Lord Wilson in this respect is no doubt due to the 
substantial overlap between the ‘feminist/gender’ category and family law cases. This is an area of 
specialisation we intend to explore further in a future article. 
Finally, we looked at the profile of the Justices across jurisdictions. The majority of cases in 
our database came from England and Wales (320 cases), with 66 from Scotland and 11 from 
Northern Ireland.122 Lords Phillips, Neuberger, Walker, Mance and Sumption were significantly more 
likely to sit on cases from England and Wales than from other jurisdictions.  It is expected that the 
Scottish judges will sit on Scottish cases, and indeed Lords Hope, Rodger and Reed were significantly 
more likely to sit on Scottish cases, with Lord Hodge close to significantly more likely, but with 
numbers too small to test accurately. Likewise, as the Northern Irish judge, Lord Kerr was 
significantly more likely to sit on Northern Irish cases. Interestingly, Lord Kerr and Lord Rodger 
demonstrated something of a Celtic specialism, with Lord Kerr also significantly more likely to sit on 
Scottish cases and Lord Rodger significantly more likely to sit on Northern Irish cases. Lady Hale and 
Lord Wilson did not specialise in any one jurisdiction but were equally likely to sit across all 
jurisdictions.123 In terms of presiding, Lord Hope was the chief presider in Scottish cases while he was 
on the Court, while the other three judicial leaders presided in roughly equal proportions of 
Northern Irish cases. Since the departure of Lord Hope, Lady Hale was significantly more likely to 
                                                          
121
  We defined a ‘feminist’ issue as one which involved women as women, or which has been the subject of feminist 
theory; while a ‘gender’ issue was one which raised an issue of difference between women and men. 
122
  In addition, we categorised five cases as coming from ‘other’ jurisdictions. Three of these came to the Supreme 
Court through the English and Welsh courts but concerned the law of the Channel Islands. Two were cases in which 
matters originating from England and Wales and Scotland or Northern Ireland were conjoined. 
123
  This finding is independent of subject specialisation; that is, it is not that substantial numbers of Scottish and 
Northern Irish cases involved issues of family law on which Lady Hale and Lord Wilson would be expected to sit. 
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preside in Scottish cases than Lord Neuberger.124 In this sense, it could be said that more than her 
formal leadership colleagues, Lady Hale has acted as a judicial leader for the whole of the UK. 
In summary, Lord Neuberger sat on the highest proportion of decisions issued during his 
time on the Court. He was a generalist in terms of sitting on cases, but with a focus in writing leading 
judgments on civil procedure and property/land/equity, and a jurisdictional focus on cases from 
England and Wales. Lord Hope wrote the highest proportion of leading judgments, with a particular 
focus on the areas of criminal procedure and human rights, and was (unsurprisingly) jurisdictionally 
specialised with regard to Scotland. Lord Kerr was the highest dissenter on the current Court and 
was (again unsurprisingly) jurisdictionally specialised with regard to Northern Ireland. Lords Rodger 
and Brown wrote comparatively high proportions of both concurrences and dissents. Lord Mance 
was the highest concurrence writer on the current Court, and also the most frequent writer 
altogether, specialising in commercial law, EU law, and public law more generally. Lord Sumption 
wrote one of the highest proportions of leading judgments across a range of subject areas, but at the 
same time, was significantly less likely to sit on human rights cases. Lords Toulson and Reed also 
wrote high proportion of leading judgments, with different specialisation profiles. Lord Wilson had a 
high dissent rate but a low overall writing rate. Lord Carnwath also had a high dissent rate and was 
less likely to sit on human rights cases, although he did write leading judgments in public law 
generally.125 These patterns provide insights into the personalities and propensities of a number of 
the Supreme Court Justices, while demonstrating many complementary strengths on the Court. The 
current Justices who do not particularly stand out in this analysis in terms of having a particular 
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  Again, this is not explained by any preponderance in the subject-matter of Scottish cases. 
125
  As noted above (notes 48 and 54-55 and accompanying text), we categorised human rights cases across topic 
areas, and included them within our broad ‘Human’ category (reflecting the substance of the rights) rather than our 
‘Public’ category (which focuses on state actions pursuant to statutory or prerogative powers). Since each case might be 
coded under several topics, there would have been overlap between ‘human rights’ and ‘public law’ cases, but the former 
was not a sub-set of the latter.  
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influence or presenting a distinctive voice are Lord Clarke and the newest appointments, Lord Hodge 
and Lord Hughes. 
Lady Hale emerged as a jurisprudential leader of the Supreme Court in a number of respects. 
She participated in more decisions numerically than any other Justice, which translated into sitting 
on one of the highest proportions of cases among the Justices. She was a leading dissenter and also 
one of the leading writers of substantive judgments as opposed to simple agreements. She 
specialised in the broad category of Human cases, but was not jurisdictionally specialised, sitting 
equally on cases from all parts of the UK.  
 
Community Leadership 
There is an increasing recognition that the visibility of the Supreme Court Justices and effective 
public relations play a key role in maintaining public confidence. 126 The first set of viewing figures for 
the TV archive of Supreme Court cases (available via YouTube) indicated that it was accessed an 
average 10,000 times a month, with the live stream being accessed up to 20,000 times in the same 
period.127 The ‘Brexit case’128 also shone a spotlight on the Court, with media images of the 
proceedings resulting in discussion and debate about the lack of gender and racial diversity on the 
bench (and in the courtroom more generally).129 Our focus in this section, however, is on out-of-
                                                          
126
  See further Cornes, above n 4, and eg the BBC4 documentary The Highest Court in the Land: Justice Makers, first 
shown in June 2012, which included interviews with Lords Phillips, Rodger and Kerr and Lady Hale. 
127
  C Green ‘Footage of Supreme Court hearings proves an unlikely hit with the public’ The Independent, 3 January 
2016.  
128
  R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and associated 
references [2017] UKSC 5. 
129
  See, eg J Parkinson ‘White men only? Brexit case and legal diversity’ BBC News, 6 December 2010: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-38211701; L Smith ‘As the Supreme Court mulls Brexit and article 50, Twitter asks: 
Where are the women?’ International Business Times, 5 December 2016: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/supreme-court-mulls-
brexit-article-50-twitter-asks-where-are-women-1594958; B Karemba ‘The Constitutional Significance of the UKSC: Is it 
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court rather than in-court and individual rather than collective activities of the Justices, in order to 
explore the final dimension of judicial leadership.  
 
Speeches 
As noted earlier, while the ‘Speeches’ page of the Supreme Court website is the most 
comprehensive repository of the text of speeches given by the Justices, it is not complete. Unlike 
with overseas visits, the Supreme Court keeps no central record of the speeches given by the 
Justices. This means that the completeness of the collection on the website is dependent on Justices 
passing on their text to be uploaded. There are several reasons why they might choose not to do so 
– the speech may be being published elsewhere, or it may be similar to other speeches the Justice 
has given at an earlier date.130 Alternatively, Justices may be more inclined to pass on the text of 
their speeches if they see it as important to allow as many people as possible access to the text or if 
they have a formal leadership role in the Court. This may go some way to explaining why Lord 
Neuberger delivered just under half (49 per cent) of the speeches published on the UKSC website 
since his appointment as President of the Supreme Court.131 Indeed, such is the number of speeches 
published by Lord Neuberger (36) that he accounted for 26 per cent of all published speeches during 
the period of our study, closely followed by Lady Hale who gave 23 per cent of the published 
speeches. In fact, though the number of Lady Hale’s speeches increased slightly following her 
appointment as Deputy President, she has been one of the most prolific speech givers (or at least 
publishers of speeches on the Court’s website) throughout her time on the Court, publishing 32 
speeches, easily outstripping the 13 speeches published by Lord Hope as Deputy President and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Time to Rethink Appointments to the Apex Court Again?’ Judicial Diversity Initiative blog, 9 December 2016: 
http://judicialdiversityinitiative.org/category/blog/.  
130
  Eg Lady Hale’s Fiona Woolf Lecture for the Women’s Division of the Law Society on ‘Women in the Judiciary’ on 
27 June 2014 followed a lecture with the same title at St Mary’s University, Twickenham on 11 June 2014 (which is not 
online).  
131
  Former President, Lord Phillips, in contrast published just three speeches during his time on the Court. 
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fellow inaugural Supreme Court Justices, Lord Mance who published eight, Lord Kerr who published 
seven and Lord Clarke who published just two. Among the more recent appointees to the Court, 
Lord Carnwath stands out with nine published speeches. By contrast, up to the end of the 2014-15 
judicial year (and indeed up to the time of writing) Lord Hughes had published no speeches on the 
Court’s website. 
Looking at the nature of the speeches, it is clear that the Justices are invited to speak to a 
wide range of people and organisations at a wide variety of venues including students and members 
of the public at universities (old and new), professional bodies and associations (including the 
Judicial College), at the Inns of Court, House of Commons, academic seminars and conferences, 
international courts, and public lectures. Of the 138 speeches published by the Justices during the 
period of our study, just under a quarter (24 per cent) were given overseas. Again, Lord Neuberger 
topped the table with the highest number of overseas speeches (eight) closely followed by Lady Hale 
(seven) and Lords Mance and Carnwath (five each). 
As might be expected, the topics of speeches varied according to the interest and 
specialisms of the Justice and audience as well as current legal and political events. In 2015, for 
example, nine of the 18 published speeches were either explicitly on, or involved extensive 
discussion of, Magna Carta. On other occasions, Justices have commented (with varying degrees of 
discretion) on the UK’s membership of the EU,132 restrictions on legal aid,133 devolution,134 and the 
                                                          
132
  Eg Lord Neuberger ‘The UK Constitutional Settlement and the Role of the UK Supreme Court’ Legal Wales 
Conference 2014, 10 October 2014; Lord Neuberger ‘The British and Europe’ Cambridge Freshfields Annual Law Lecture 
2014, 12 February 2014. 
133
  Lady Hale ‘Young Legal Aid Lawyers: Social Mobility’ London South Bank University, 30 October 2013. 
134
   Lord Hope ‘The Role of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom’ The Lord Rodger of Earlsferry Memorial 
Lecture, 19 November 2011; Lord Neuberger ‘Magna Carta: The Bible of the English Constitution or a Disgrace to the 
English Nation?’ Guildford Cathedral, 18 June 2015. 
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possible repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998.135 Overall, just over a third of the speeches published 
on the Supreme Court website fell primarily within our Human category (37 per cent), followed by 
Public (31 per cent), Commercial (11 per cent) and Criminal (four per cent). In addition, 15 per cent 
of speeches were primarily aimed at judicial processes or the regulation of the legal profession. Lord 
Neuberger, for example, often took on ‘big picture’ topics, particularly in relation to the role of the 
Supreme Court and the judiciary more generally, the process of judging and the future of the legal 
profession,136 a reflection no doubt of his role as President. All of Lord Wilson’s speeches were on an 
aspect of family law,137 while Lord Mance focused on technicalities of commercial law and EU 
matters and Lord Sumption often took a historical perspective or approach to the topic under 
discussion.138 In line with her profile as ‘Ms Diversity’,139 Lady Hale often spoke on issues relating to 
equality and diversity, particularly in relation to women and children. All but one of her published 
speeches came within our Human category. Although only five of those speeches focused directly on 
                                                          
135
  Lady Hale ‘Georgetown Commencement Speech’ 23 May 2010; Lady Hale ‘Salford Human Rights Conference 
2010’ 4 June 2010.  
136
  Eg above n 73; ‘“Judge Not, That Ye Be Not Judged”: Judging Judicial Decision-Making’ FA Mann Lecture, 29 
January 2015; ‘Sausages and the Judicial Process: The Limits of Transparency’ Annual Conference of the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales, Sydney, 1 August 2014; ‘The Future of the Bar’ Conference of the Bar Councils of Northern Ireland and 
Ireland, Belfast, 20 June 2014. 
137
  ‘Adoption: Complexities Beyond the Law’ Denning Society Lecture at Lincoln’s Inn, 13 November 2014; ‘Marriage 
is made for Man, not Man for Marriage’ Medico-Legal Society in Belfast, Northern Ireland, 18 February 2014; ‘Out of His 
Shadow: The Long Struggle of Wives under English Law’ The High Sheriff of Oxfordshire’s Annual Law Lecture, 9 October 
2012; Keynote Address at a reception hosted by Collaborative Family Law, at the Reform Club, 29 November 2011. 
138
 Eg ‘Magna Carta Then and Now’ Friends of the British Library AGM, 9 March 2015; ‘The Disunited Kingdom: 
England, Ireland and Scotland’ Denning Society, 5 November 2013. 
139
  L Peacock ‘Britain's most senior female judge, Baroness Hale: “My biggest fear ... When am I going to be found 
out?”’ The Telegraph, 18 April 2014. 
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diversity in the legal profession and judiciary,140 this was significantly more than her colleagues: 
Lords Phillips, Neuberger and Sumption each spoke once on the topic.141  
Occasionally, a speech may be used by a Justice to ‘set out his or her stall’ in relation to a 
particular area of legal doctrine. Lord Sumption’s ‘Reflexions on the Law of Illegality’ speech to the 
Chancery Bar Association in 2012 can be seen as an example of this.142 Although these kinds of 
speeches have given rise to concerns that the judge’s extra-judicial comments may disqualify them 
from sitting on future cases, this notion has been rebutted by Lord Neuberger, who has argued that 
judges come to cases with open – not blank – minds, and that judges can and do change their 
minds.143 
 
Overseas engagements 
Overseas engagements are a reflection of the UK Supreme Court’s world leadership as a court (for 
example requests to know more about various administrative issues, transparency, case 
management and so forth), but also reflect the worldwide profile of individual Justices. It is clear 
that they are in demand for speaking engagements on an international level. Together they visited 
44 different countries during the period of our study, that is, just under one quarter of all the 
                                                          
140
  Hale, above n 130; ‘Equality in the Judiciary’ Kuttan Menon Memorial Lecture, 21 February 2013; ‘It’s a Man’s 
World: Redressing the Balance’ Norfolk Law Lecture 2012, University of East Anglia, 16 February 2012; ‘Dignity’ Ethel 
Benjamin Commemorative Address 2010, 7 May 2010. 
141
  Lord Neuberger ‘Rainbow Lecture 2014 on Diversity’ House of Commons, 12 March 2014; Lord Sumption ‘Home 
Truths about Judicial Diversity’ Bar Council Law Reform Lecture, 15 November 2012; Lord Phillips ‘Judicial Independence 
and Accountability: A View from the Supreme Court’ UCL Constitution Unit, 8 February 2011.  
142
  The defence of illegality has reached the Supreme Court on no less that three separate occasions over the last 
three years and it is well known that there are stark differences of opinion among the Justices. See further J Lee ‘The 
Judicial Individuality of Lord Sumption’ (2017) 40(2) UNSWLJ 874. 
143
  Lord Neuberger ‘The Remedial Constructive Trust – Fact or Fiction’ Banking Services and Finance Law Association 
Conference, Queenstown, 10 August 2014 [1]-[3]. 
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countries in the world. The Justices who undertook the largest number of overseas engagements by 
some distance were Lord Mance (38), Lady Hale (33) and Lord Carnwath (25). Combined, they 
undertook over half of the 183 overseas engagements listed in the Annual Reports. When Justices’ 
lengths of time on the Court were taken into account, Lords Carnwath and Mance came out on top 
(with an average of 8.3 and 6.3 overseas engagements per year respectively), followed by Lord 
Phillips and Lady Hale (average 6.0 and 5.5 per year respectively). Lady Hale’s overseas engagements 
increased after she became Deputy President. By contrast, Lord Neuberger had an average of 3.3 
overseas engagements per year and Lord Hope an average of 1.3. Lords Saville, Rodger and Brown 
undertook no recorded overseas engagements during their time on the Supreme Court and Lord 
Hodge similarly undertook no recorded overseas engagements from his appointment to the end of 
our study period. 
 The types of overseas engagements fell into several categories, including official visits (being 
part of a delegation, annual meetings with the European Court of Justice, meetings with 
Parliamentarians, the Network of Presidents of Supreme Courts); judicial activities and contacts 
(meetings with judges, judicial training, judicial conferences, meetings to develop good practice 
guidelines, sitting as a judge in Hong Kong); and academic and practitioner contacts (attending and 
speaking at conferences, giving lectures, award of an honorary doctorate, visiting fellowships, 
university teaching). Table 4 shows each Justice’s overseas engagements broken down by these 
categories. 
[insert Table 4 about here] 
As the Justice in charge of international judicial liaison, it is not surprising that Lord Mance 
had the highest number of official and judicial engagements, although he also undertook a high 
number of academic/practitioner engagements overseas.  Lady Hale topped the rankings for 
overseas academic/practitioner engagements, but undertook fewer official engagements – though 
no fewer than Lord Neuberger and more than Lord Hope. Several of her overseas trips were for the 
International Association of Women Judges, of which she was President in 2010-2012. Lord 
48 
 
Carnwarth also had a high number of overseas academic/practitioner engagements, often involving 
participation in international environmental law conferences. Lord Phillips was second behind Lord 
Mance for official and judicial engagements overseas, but undertook fewer academic/practitioner 
engagements. Lord Clarke also had a relatively high number of judicial engagements. Lords Dyson, 
Wilson, Sumption, Toulson and Hughes were at the lowest end of all categories, having undertaken 
either one or no recorded overseas engagements in each category. 
 
Publications 
The publication activities of the Justices unsurprisingly mirrored to some extent their respective 
profiles in relation to speeches and overseas visits. The most common form of publication for all 
Justices was articles in journals of some description.144 Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale published the 
highest number of articles during their time on the Supreme Court (11 each), followed by Lord 
Carnwath (seven). Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale differed substantially, however, in the nature and 
duration of their publishing careers. Most of Lord Neuberger’s publications dated from after he 
became President of the Supreme Court. Prior to that, he had published only two journal articles. 
And while the genres of his 11 Supreme Court articles were mixed, they tended towards practitioner 
rather than academic publications. Lady Hale, by contrast, has been the most consistently prolific 
Justice overall, as might be expected from her academic background. But even while on the High 
Court, Court of Appeal and House of Lords she published 16 articles, almost all in academic journals, 
both generalist and specialist. Lord Carnwath has also been a fairly consistently prolific author, 
having published eight articles while on the High Court and Court of Appeal. His Supreme Court 
articles have been published mainly in specialist academic (environmental law) journals, while earlier 
articles also appeared in generalist academic journals. 
                                                          
144
  ‘Articles’ here includes book reviews and case comments. We have also included book chapters in edited 
collections in the count, although Lady Hale was the only Justice to publish in this form. 
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 The only other Justices to publish more than one or two articles while on the Supreme Court 
were Lord Hope (six), Lord Phillips (four), Lord Walker (four) and Lord Mance (three). Lord Hope was 
a frequent author before joining the Supreme Court (for example publishing 15 articles while in the 
House of Lords), and continued to publish after his retirement. His work was mostly published in 
generalist academic journals. Unlike Lord Neuberger, Lord Phillips undertook most of his published 
writing earlier in his career (publishing nine articles before his appointment to the House of Lords) 
and did less as President of the Supreme Court. Lord Walker’s output was fairly consistent 
throughout his judicial career, both on the Supreme Court and earlier. The same was true for Lord 
Mance, who published mainly in generalist academic journals, plus several contributions to Lloyd’s 
Maritime & Commercial Law Quarterly.  
 Several of the Justices wrote, co-authored or edited books prior to their appointment to the 
Supreme Court, most notably Lord Collins, Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath, but also including Lords 
Rodger, Mance, Reed, Toulson and Hodge. On the Supreme Court, three of the Justices maintained 
general editorial roles: Lord Collins as General Editor of Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of 
Laws, Lady Hale as Consultant Editor on Clarke, Hall and Morrison on Children, and Lord Neuberger 
as Editor-in-Chief of The Civil Court Practice.  However only Lady Hale has authored a book while on 
the Supreme Court, publishing the 5th edition of Mental Health Law in 2010. Apart from Lord 
Carnwath, none of the more recently-appointed Supreme Court Justices have distinguished 
themselves as notable extra-judicial writers. While Lord Sumption was a well-known historian prior 
to his appointment to the Court and continues to publish historical texts, his legal writing was and 
has remained more limited. 
 In summary the publicly visible work of community leadership among the Justices of the 
Supreme Court appears to have been concentrated in only a few hands: those of Lady Hale, Lord 
Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Carnwath and Lord Phillips. Lord Phillips’ community leadership was 
focused on overseas engagements. He undertook a relatively high proportion of such engagements 
during his time on the Court, but published relatively few speeches and journal articles. Lord 
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Neuberger has published a large number of speeches and articles since he became President of the 
Supreme Court, but has not been so prominent in relation to overseas engagements. Conversely, 
Lord Mance leads the field in overseas engagements, not only by virtue of his international judicial 
liaison role, but also via academic and practitioner engagements, while his speech and article 
publication rates have been more modest. Lord Carnwath and Lady Hale are the only all-rounders.  
Lord Carnwath has published substantial numbers of speeches and articles, particularly in the 
specialist area of environmental and planning law, and has undertaken a substantial number of 
overseas engagements. Lady Hale exemplifies the maxim, ‘If you want something done, ask a busy 
woman’. Her workload in terms of speeches and overseas engagements has increased since she 
became Deputy President, but even before that, she was a leader in terms of published speeches, 
published articles and books, and overseas engagements, especially invited lectures. This level of 
community outreach is not counterbalanced, for example, by sitting on fewer cases. As we have 
seen, Lady Hale sits on the highest proportion of Supreme Court cases after Lord Neuberger, 10 per 
cent more than most of her judicial colleagues.145 
 
Conclusion 
As the privileged incumbents of the highest judicial office in the UK, one might expect all of the 
Justices of the Supreme Court to be judicial leaders of some kind. The various functions performed 
by the Court – its internal governance, its decision-making and its symbolic position – create 
demands for administrative, jurisprudential and community leadership. Rather than attempting, as 
most previous literature has done, to identify ‘the’ supreme of the Supreme Court Justices in purely 
jurisprudential terms, this article has explored the various dimensions of judicial leadership in order 
to consider in what ways and to what extent Supreme Court Justices can be publicly observed to be 
                                                          
145
  This remains true even when Privy Council cases are taken into account. Among the four currently-sitting Justices 
who joined the Supreme Court at its inception, Lady Hale has sat on a total of 285 Supreme Court and Privy Council cases, 
compared to Lord Clarke’s 269, Lord Mance’s 267 and Lord Kerr’s 257. 
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acting as leaders. In relation to the Court’s formal leaders – Lords Phillips, Hope and Neuberger and 
Lady Hale as Deputy President – the question has been what difference they have made in those 
formal roles. In relation to the other Justices (including Lady Hale before she became Deputy 
President), the question has been what difference they have made by virtue of their membership of 
the Supreme Court.  The answers to these questions have obvious implications for the future of the 
Court, and for future appointments to the Court and to formal leadership roles.  
 Our analysis suggests there are a number of ways of being a judicial leader. Formal 
leadership roles on the Supreme Court do translate into both jurisprudential and community 
leadership. Jurisprudentially, formal leaders tend to sit on high proportions of cases, and the 
presiding Justice – who is almost always the President or Deputy President – is more likely to write 
the leading judgment in a case and more likely to have their opinion of the outcome of the case 
prevail (that is, they are less likely to be in dissent). Moreover, their ability to choose who writes the 
leading judgment (in their stead) enables them to influence the jurisprudential direction of the Court 
by proxy. In this context, the Neuberger-Hale leadership regime has given more leading judgment-
writing opportunities to other Justices than did the Phillips-Hope leadership regime. In relation to 
community leadership, the President and Deputy President have tended to be prominent in at least 
one (although not necessarily all) of the areas of giving speeches, publishing journal articles, and 
overseas engagements. The different jurisprudential and community leadership profiles of Lord 
Phillips and Lord Neuberger illustrate that there are different ways of being President of the 
Supreme Court, although at least some willingness to engage in community outreach activities of 
some kind seems to be an essential criterion. 
 Jurisprudential and community leadership roles may also be assumed by individual Justices 
regardless of any formal leadership responsibilities. In this respect, our analysis suggests that while 
many of the Justices have taken on some kind of observable jurisprudential leadership role, few 
have combined it with an observable community leadership role, and some have done neither. The 
two Justices outside the Court’s formal leadership positions who evidence both jurisprudential and 
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community leadership are Lords Mance and Carnwath. The group of Justices who may be seen as 
jurisprudential but not community leaders consists of Lords Hope, Kerr, Roger, Brown, Sumption, 
Toulson and Reed. On the measures of leadership used in this article, Lords Clarke, Wilson, Hodge 
and Hughes have made relatively modest or minimal contributions, even taking into account the 
recent arrival of the latter two Justices on the Court. 
Lady Hale has emerged as a clear leader in all three of the public dimensions of leadership 
examined. Like Lords Mance and Carnwath, she was a jurisprudential and community leader before 
becoming Deputy President, and as Deputy President she has extended her contributions in these 
areas as well as performing her administrative role. Most notably, she has participated in more 
Supreme Court decisions numerically than any other Justice, when she writes the leading judgment 
she is most likely to produce unanimity, and she has sat equally on cases from all parts of the UK. In 
addition, she has been a leader in all three forms of community outreach discussed: published 
speeches, published articles and books, and overseas engagements, especially invited lectures. 
As well as identifying the forms of leadership evidenced by individual Justices, these findings 
can also be viewed from the perspective of the Supreme Court as an institution.146 The Court will see 
a substantial number of vacancies over the next two years as Lords Mance, Clarke, Sumption and 
Hughes join Lords Neuberger and Toulson in reaching the mandatory retirement age. This will 
deprive the Court not only of its formal leader, but also of several of its jurisprudential leaders and 
one of its pre-eminent community leaders. These are factors which, we argue, ought to be taken 
into account in the appointment processes for new Supreme Court Justices, in a way that goes 
beyond mere subject-matter or jurisdictional specialisation. Simply appointing a Chancery judge147 or 
                                                          
146
  See TT Arvind and L Stirton ‘Legal Ideology, Legal Doctrine and the UK’s Top Judges’ [2016] PL 418, pp 430-433, 
who note the importance of institutional design and the need to achieve ‘an appropriate balance of attitudes and 
dispositions’ on the Court. 
147
  Cf eg Joshua Rozenberg’s suggestion that Lord Toulson should be replaced by a Chancery lawyer (despite the fact 
that Toulson is a common lawyer): ‘Warming the Bench’ Law Society Gazette, 7 March 2016. 
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a Scottish or Northern Irish judge for the sake of subject-matter or jurisdictional representation,148 
ignores other important dimensions of judicial leadership. While, as noted at the beginning of this 
article, the current selection process for the Supreme Court requires applicants to demonstrate an 
appreciation of the developing nature of the constitution and law and a willingness to participate in 
the wider representational role of a Supreme Court Justice, we would suggest that the requirement 
to demonstrate a capacity to exercise some form of jurisprudential and community leadership 
should be much more clearly articulated in the Supreme Court selection process.  
At the same time, we do not advocate that eligibility for Supreme Court appointment should 
be confined to those who have held previous senior judicial administrative or managerial roles. This 
would significantly narrow the pool (both in terms of numbers and diversity), and the evidence from 
the current Supreme Court is that having held such office is not necessarily a predictor of an active 
leadership role on the Court. Indeed, some of the Court’s notable leaders (such as Lord Mance and 
Lady Hale) did not have this kind of prior experience. Rather, leadership qualities and the capacity to 
exercise leadership should be assessed much more broadly. 
Consideration should also be given to the intersection between the demands of 
jurisprudential and community leadership and judicial diversity. In relation to jurisprudential 
leadership, bringing different life experience and a different point of view to the Court is likely to 
enhance the development of the law.149 In relation to community leadership, judges who are not 
                                                          
148
  Arguably, Lady Hale’s and Lord Wilson’s performance as jurisdictional generalists calls into question the need for 
separate jurisdictional representation among the permanent members of the Court, with the possibility of drafting in 
jurisdictional specialists as temporary Justices for particular hearings when necessary. Nevertheless, jurisdictional 
representation is the one form of quota/affirmative action provided for in the CRA. The point remains, however, that 
whichever Scottish or Northern Irish candidates are chosen, they ought to be able to demonstrate and be willing to take on 
some other form of judicial leadership. 
149
  There is a substantial literature on this point, eg Hale, above n 104; Rackley, above n 104; R Hunter ‘More Than 
Just a Different Face: Judicial Diversity and Decision-making’ (2015) 6(1) CLP 119; T Etherton ‘Liberty, the Archetype and 
Diversity: A Philosophy of Judging’ [2010] PL 727; E Sheehy, above n 104; Belleau and Johnson, above n 104. 
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white males from privileged educational backgrounds would enhance the democratic 
representativeness of the Court and could offer symbolic leadership as well as practical mentorship 
to a wider section of the legal profession.150 More generally, given women’s observed greater facility 
for multi-tasking151 (as exemplified by Lady Hale), and the equally observed need for non-traditional 
judges to prove themselves by working twice as hard as their more entitled colleagues,152 the criteria 
of diversity and leadership activity may prove to be entirely complementary. 
In short, Lady Hale, Lord Carnwath and Lord Reed need to be joined by a diverse group of 
new Justices who are capable of and prepared to shoulder the burdens of administrative, 
jurisprudential and community leadership, and thus to play their part in a new era of judicial 
leadership both on and by the UK Supreme Court. 
                                                          
150
  Some examples from the substantial literature on this point include: Lord Neuberger ‘The Role of the Supreme 
Court Seven Years on – Lessons Learnt’ Bar Council Law Reform Lecture 2016, 21 November 2016; K Malleson ‘Justifying 
Gender Equality on the Bench: Why Difference Won’t Do’ (2003) 11(1) FLS 1; SA Ifill ‘Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, 
Impartiality and Representation on State Trial Courts’ (1997-1998) 39 Boston College L Rev 95; RV McGregor ‘Sandra Day 
O’Connor’ (2006) 119(5) HLR 1245; L Moran, ‘Judicial Diversity and the Challenge of Sexuality: Some Preliminary Findings’ 
(2006) 28 Syd L Rev 565; S Kenney Gender and Justice: Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter (New York: Routledge, 
2013); R Cowan ‘Do Women on South Africa’s Courts Make a Difference?’ in U Schultz and G Shaw (eds) Gender and 
Judging (Oxford: Hart, 2013) 117.    
151
  See, eg, A Zaiceva and K Zimmerman ‘Do Ethnic Minorities “Stretch” Their Time? UK Household Evidence on 
Multitasking’ (2011) 9 Review of Economics of the Household 181 (inter alia, reviewing the literature on gender and multi-
tasking). See also S Roach Anleu and K Mack ‘Judicial Performance and Experiences of Judicial Work: Findings from Socio-
Legal Research’ (2014) 4(5) Onati Socio-Legal Series 1015, pp 1032-1034. 
152
  See, eg, R Hunter ‘The High Price of Success: The Backlash Against Women Judges in Australia’ in E Sheehy and S 
McIntyre (eds) Calling for Change: Women, Law and the Legal Profession (Ottawa: Ottawa University Press, 2006) 281, pp 
282-283; M Thornton Dissonance and Distrust: Women in the Legal Profession (Melbourne: OUP, 1996) pp 203-204; U 
Schultz,‘”I Was Noticed and I Was Asked…” Women’s Careers in the Judiciary: Results of an Empirical Study for the Ministry 
of Justice in Northrhine-Westfalia, Germany’ in U Schultz and G Shaw (eds) Gender and Judging (Oxford: Hart, 2013) p 158. 
See also H Sommerlad ‘Let History Judge? Gender, Race, Class and Performative Identity: A Study of Women Judges in 
England and Wales’ in U Schultz and G Shaw (eds) Gender and Judging (Oxford: Hart, 2013) 355. 
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Table 1 – Types of judgments 2009-2015 among current SCJs 
Justice Leading 
Judgment* % 
 
Written 
concurrence % 
Written (partial) 
dissent % 
Simple 
Agreement** 
% 
Lord Neuberger 22.7 20.8 2.7  53.7 
Lady Hale 19.9 19.0 10.2 50.9 
Lord Mance 19.7 30.3 8.9 41.2 
Lord Kerr 10.2 17.5 12.6 59.6 
Lord Clarke 10.8 21.0 7.9 60.3 
Lord Wilson 16.8 8.8 5.3 69.0 
Lord Sumption 25.2 13.5 5.4 55.9 
Lord Reed 23.2 14.5 4.8 57.6 
Lord Carnwath 18.6 15.9 10.3 55.2 
Lord Toulson 25.7 13.6 2.8 58.1 
Lord Hughes 12.7 17.5 1.6 68.3 
Lord Hodge 20.6 10.3 6.8 62.0 
 
* includes read Judgment of the Court 
** includes participated in Judgment of the Court 
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Table 2 – Areas of specialisation 2009-2015 among current SCJs 
Area More likely to sit More likely to write 
leading judgment 
 
Human rights Lord Kerr none 
EU law Lord Mance Lord Mance 
Tort Lord Mance Lord Reed 
Contract/commercial Lord Mance 
Lord Clarke 
Lord Mance 
Lord Clarke 
Immigration/asylum Lord Wilson Lord Kerr 
Lord Carnwath 
Civil procedure Lord Clarke Lord Neuberger 
Lord Clarke 
Criminal procedure Lord Kerr 
Lord Toulson 
Lord Hughes 
none 
Property/land/equity Lord Sumption 
Lord Carnwath 
Lord Neuberger 
Lord Hodge 
Family  Lady Hale 
Lord Wilson 
Lord Hughes 
Lady Hale 
Lord Wilson 
Employment Lady Hale Lady Hale 
Tax Lord Reed 
Lord Carnwath 
Lord Hodge 
Lord Reed 
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Table 3 – Broad areas of specialisation 2009-2015 among current SCJs 
 
Broad area More likely to sit More likely to write 
leading judgment 
 
Commercial Lord Mance 
Lord Clarke 
Lord Sumption 
Lord Mance 
Lord Clarke 
Lord Sumption 
Criminal Lord Kerr 
Lord Toulson 
Lord Hughes 
Lord Toulson 
Lord Hughes 
Human Lady Hale 
Lord Kerr 
Lord Wilson 
Lady Hale 
Lord Wilson 
Public none Lord Mance 
Lord Carnwath 
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Table 4 – Overseas engagements 2009-2015 by category 
Justice Official n Judicial n Academic/ 
Practitioner n 
 
Total n 
Lord Mance 7 10 21 38 
Lady Hale 4 5 24 33 
Lord Carnwath 3 1 21 25 
Lord Phillips 5 6 7 18 
Lord Walker 3 2 9 14 
Lord Clarke 2 5 5 12 
Lord Neuberger 4 0 6 10 
Lord Collins 0 3 6 9 
Lord Kerr 1 0 6 7 
Lord Reed 2 2 2 6 
Lord Hope 2 1 2 5 
Lord Hughes 1 1 0 2 
Lord Dyson 0 1 0 1 
Lord Wilson 0 0 1 1 
Lord Sumption 0 0 1 1 
Lord Toulson 1 0 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
